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I. INTRODUCTION
In Crawford v. Washington,1 the Supreme Court remade the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to exclude all testimonial hearsay statements
made by a declarant whom the defendant had no opportunity to confront
either before or during trial.2 The Court therefore rejected prior law holding
that confrontation is unnecessary when a declarant‘s statement fits an
established hearsay exception, or is otherwise shown to be reliable by
* Brendan Moore Professor of Advocacy and Director of Trial Competitions, Fordham
University School of Law. Thanks to participants in the Fordham Law School Faculty Colloquium,
Bennett Capers, and especially George Thomas for comments on this Article.
** Associate, Kobre & Kim LLP and Adjunct Professor of Trial Advocacy, Fordham
University School of Law.
1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2. Id. at 51; see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009) (―In
Crawford, after reviewing the [Confrontation] Clause‘s historical underpinnings,‖ the Court held that
the Confrontation Clause ―guarantees a Defendant‘s right to confront those who bear testimony
against him.‖).
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particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.3 The Court reasoned that using
the reliability of hearsay statements as a reason for dispensing with
confrontation was incongruous with the Constitution‘s view that confrontation
is required to assure the reliability of testimonial hearsay.4
Since Crawford, scholars have rightly paid much attention to the question
of whether a hearsay statement is ―testimonial‖ and thus requires
confrontation.5 However, they have paid virtually no attention to whether a
statement is hearsay in the first place. Although less frequently dispositive,
that question is nonetheless important because only out-of-court statements
that are hearsay trigger the right to confrontation.6 Statements offered for the
truth of the matter asserted require a judgment about a declarant‘s credibility,
and it is this need for a credibility determination that triggers the defendant‘s
confrontation right.7 Statements offered only for the fact that they were said,
and not offered for their truth, do not require confrontation because the
credibility of the speaker has no bearing on the probative value of the
evidence.8
This Article argues that courts violate the Confrontation Clause by
misusing the non-hearsay rubric to admit, without confrontation, two
categories of testimonial statements. The first consists of nonassertive
conduct, which, although exempt from the Federal Rules of Evidence‘s
(Federal Rules) definition of hearsay, is hearsay under the common law
definition that was in use when the Confrontation Clause was adopted. Under
the historical approach to confrontation, required by the Court‘s opinion in
Crawford, such conduct, when testimonial, requires confrontation.
Nonetheless, courts routinely admit testimonial, nonassertive conduct without

3. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). ―Roberts conditioned the admissibility of all hearsay
evidence on whether it falls under a ‗firmly rooted hearsay exception‘ or bears ‗particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.‘‖ Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). The
Supreme Court overruled Roberts in Crawford by ―restoring the unavailability and cross-examination
requirements.‖ Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825 n.4 (2006); see also Melendez-Diaz, 129
S. Ct. at 2536 (rejecting the argument that the Confrontation Clause excludes hearsay that is the
product of neutral, scientific testing as ―little more than an invitation to return to our overruled
decision in Roberts, which held that evidence with ‗particularized guarantees of trustworthiness‘ was
admissible notwithstanding the Confrontation Clause‖) (citation omitted).
4. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61–62 (―Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This
is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.‖).
5. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530; Davis, 547 U.S. at 817.
6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n.9 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)) (―The
Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the
truth of the matter asserted.‖).
7. Street, 471 U.S. at 414 (the confrontation right depends upon the need for cross-examination
to challenge credibility).
8. Id.
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confrontation by erroneously equating it with non-hearsay evidence that does
not implicate a declarant‘s credibility. In fact, such evidence implicates the
declarant‘s credibility, as the common law well understood. Consequently,
although nonassertive conduct is exempt from hearsay under a revised
definition, nonassertive conduct is no different from evidence that was
inadmissible hearsay at the Founding. Its admissibility without confrontation
depends exclusively upon whether it is testimonial, not whether it is
admissible under modern hearsay policy.
The second category consists of testimonial statements admitted as nonhearsay background evidence to explain the investigators‘ actions, even
though the defendant has not questioned the investigators‘ behavior. Courts
routinely admit those statements for their ―effect on the listener‖ to explain
the course of the investigation. They hold that such statements raise no
Confrontation Clause issue because they are not admitted for their truth.
Nonetheless, the statements‘ admission for that purpose erroneously assumes
that the reasons for the investigators‘ actions are relevant absent the
defendant‘s challenge. If courts admit the statements when there is no charge
of investigative misconduct to rebut, the jury has to use them for their truth, in
violation of the defendant‘s confrontation right, if it considers them at all.
Regardless of whether the jury uses the statements directly as proof of what
they assert or indirectly as a basis for concluding that information available to
investigators supports the prosecution‘s claim of the defendant‘s guilt, the
jury uses the evidence for a substantive purpose, which requires confrontation.
Only when testimonial statements made to investigators are necessary to rebut
an express or implied charge that the investigators acted improperly can
courts justify their admission to explain the investigators‘ behavior as a nonhearsay purpose that does not require confrontation.
Consequently, Crawford requires a constitutionally mandated definition of
hearsay that reflects the full scope of the confrontation right. This definition
must trump the federal and state definitions that narrow the scope of hearsay
to reflect modern policy and require confrontation of testimonial, nonassertive
conduct. Also, this definition must trump judicial applications of the hearsay
rule admitting testimonial statements as non-hearsay unless they are clearly
relevant to a legitimate non-hearsay purpose. This means excluding
testimonial statements as background evidence offered to justify investigators‘
conduct unless the defendant first questions it.
Part II explains the difference between declarant-centered and assertioncentered definitions of hearsay and shows that the Federal Rules‘ assertioncentered definition does not comport with the Supreme Court‘s view that the
Constitution excuses confrontation only when admission of a declarant‘s
statement does not implicate his credibility. It argues that courts in postCrawford cases have missed this lack of parallelism because they conflate
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statements offered to show the truth of what the declarant believes, although
not what he intended to assert, with statements not offered to show anything
that the declarant believes. Consequently, courts in many cases confuse
nonassertive conduct with evidence that is not hearsay because it is not
offered to show any matter whose truth depends upon the declarant‘s
credibility. Such cases also show that nonassertive conduct under the Federal
Rules‘ definition of hearsay is sometimes testimonial under the Court‘s
current definition. Testimonial, nonassertive conduct requires confrontation
unless there is specific historical support for the proposition that courts, at the
time of the Founding, exempted nonassertive conduct from confrontation or
from their understanding of hearsay evidence.
Part III argues that there is no historical evidence of a Founding-era
practice by which common law courts exempted nonassertive conduct from
the definition of hearsay or from the confrontation requirement. Indeed, the
only explicit discussion of the issue suggests that, when the court in Wright v.
Tatham9 held in 1837 that hearsay comprised nonassertive conduct, it stated a
position that it considered already implicit in the common law definition. In
any event, Wright offers no suggestion that the court was overruling or
otherwise rejecting an established, contrary position that existed at the time of
the Founding.
Without historical evidence of a practice exempting
nonassertive conduct from confrontation—equivalent to that which the Court
found sufficient to create a sui generis exemption of dying declarations10—the
Sixth Amendment requires confrontation, despite subsequent changes in the
hearsay definition that reflect evolving evidence policy.
Part IV proposes changing the basic definition of hearsay back to that of
the Founding era to include nonassertive conduct. The change satisfies the
constitutional command of the Confrontation Clause while providing
jurisdictions with the option of creating a hearsay exception for nonassertive
conduct as a matter of hearsay policy. With minimal disruption to existing
practice, the proposal ensures that all testimonial hearsay, as understood at the
Founding and not subject to contemporaneous exception, triggers the
confrontation right, while allowing the hearsay policy of different
jurisdictions to determine whether to admit nonassertive conduct that does not
implicate the Confrontation Clause.
Adopting a hearsay exception for nonassertive conduct, rather than
excluding it from the hearsay definition, also generates collateral benefits in
cases where the confrontation right is not involved. Admitting a declarant‘s
nonassertive conduct pursuant to a hearsay exception allows an opponent of
that evidence to impeach the declarant‘s credibility pursuant to the usual rules
9. (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Exch. Div.).
10. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2684–86 (2008); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.
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allowing impeachment of hearsay declarants, a result that can only enhance
the accuracy of the fact-finding process.11 In contrast, current law imposes a
double disadvantage on the criminal defendant against whom the prosecution
offers nonassertive conduct. He has no confrontation right assuring that he
can cross-examine the declarant and, once the evidence is admitted, no right
to impeach the declarant as if he had testified.
Part V examines cases in which courts found confrontation unnecessary
because the prosecution offered testimonial statements made to investigators
only for their ―effect on the listener,‖ to explain why investigators acted as
they did, and not for their truth.12 This Part shows that courts routinely admit
such testimonial statements for this non-hearsay purpose although the
defendant did not question the investigators‘ actions. While courts correctly
referenced hearsay law‘s distinction between using such statements for their
truth and merely for the fact that they were heard to explain the investigators‘
conduct, the same courts misapplied the non-hearsay rubric in a way that
potentially rendered the confrontation right useless. Those courts improperly
applied the ―effect on listener‖ exception when the defendant did not
challenge the investigators‘ reasons for acting. Thus, the ―effect on listener‖
exception admits testimonial hearsay for a purpose that, although permissible
under the hearsay rule, is nonetheless irrelevant. As a result, juries that
choose to use it will do so for its truth—its only relevant, though
impermissible, purpose. To avoid that result, Part V proposes that admitting
testimonial hearsay for its effect on investigators is a Confrontation Clause
violation unless and until the defendant raises an issue about the investigators‘
conduct. Only when used to rebut the defendant‘s claim would the evidence
be relevant and permissible. Part VI concludes.
II. TESTIMONIAL, NONASSERTIVE CONDUCT
When deciding whether out-of-court statements require confrontation,
courts properly consider whether prosecutors have offered such statements for
the truth of the matter asserted.13 If not, confrontation is unnecessary because
the credibility of the declarant is irrelevant, and there is no reason to worry
that the absence of cross-examination will undermine the evidence‘s
reliability. The exemption from confrontation of statements not offered for
their truth is frequently stated as a rule holding that only hearsay statements
trigger the confrontation right. Nevertheless, equating non-hearsay with
statements that the prosecution has not offered for their truth is wrong when
11. See infra notes 149–151 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(c); Street, 471 U.S. at 413–14 (holding that when an out-ofcourt statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter, the Confrontation Clause is not
implicated).
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we consider the difference between the definition of hearsay most prevalent
today and the original common law definition retained by a few jurisdictions.
Courts currently employ different definitions of a hearsay statement. The
most common definition is inconsistent with the Court‘s view that the
Constitution requires confrontation whenever the probative value of a
testimonial statement depends upon a declarant‘s credibility. The first
definition is ―declarant-centered.‖ Under the declarant-centered definition,
hearsay statements include any out-of-court verbal or nonverbal conduct
establishing the declarant‘s belief about a fact whose relevancy depends upon
the accuracy of his belief.14 This definition comports with Crawford because
it includes any statements whose probative value depends upon a declarant‘s
credibility.
The second definition of a hearsay statement is ―assertion-centered.‖ It
excludes statements whose probative value depends upon the declarant‘s
credibility if the declarant did not intend the statements ―as an assertion‖ or
the prosecution offers those statements for a reason ―other than the matter
asserted.‖15 In 1975, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee adopted the
assertion-centered definition, which is now used in most jurisdictions.16 An
assertion-centered definition establishes that verbal or nonverbal conduct is
hearsay only when the actor intends by that conduct to assert the fact that its
proponent is using it to prove. The rationale for adopting the assertion-based
test is that the sincerity danger is reduced when a person unintentionally
reveals his belief in certain facts rather than when he intentionally asserts it,
and that a person acting on a belief, rather than merely asserting it, will
ordinarily be more careful about what he perceived or remembers.17
Although codified in the Federal Rules and used in most states, the
assertion-based definition‘s exclusion of nonassertive conduct18 from hearsay
is inconsistent with Crawford. Even proponents of the Federal Rules‘
assertion-centered definition concede that nonassertive conduct used to prove
a declarant‘s beliefs that the proponent contends are accurate implicates the
14. We adopt the terms ―declarant-centered‖ and ―assertion-centered‖ from Professor Roger
Park‘s classic article “I Didn‟t Tell Them Anything About You”: Implied Assertions as Hearsay
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MINN. L. REV. 783 (1990).
15. See FED. R. EVID. 801 & advisory committee‘s notes.
16. Id. The Advisory Committee makes explicit the Federal Rules‘ adoption of the assertioncentered definition, noting that the ―effect of the definition of ‗statement‘ is to exclude from the
operation of the hearsay rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or nonverbal, not intended as an
assertion.‖ Id.
17. Id. (recognizing that nonverbal conduct not intended as an assertion is ―untested with
respect to the perception, memory, and narration,‖ but finding that ―these dangers are minimal in the
absence of an intent to assert and do not justify the loss of the evidence on hearsay grounds‖).
18. For the sake of simplicity, this Article uses the term ―nonassertive conduct‖ to include
assertive conduct that is offered for something other than its intended inference.
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declarant‘s testimonial capacities, and thus, his credibility. They argue,
however, that hearsay dangers,19 although not eliminated for nonassertive
conduct, are sufficiently reduced to justify admission.20 However significant
to the policy debate about what the hearsay rule should cover, this argument is
irrelevant to the application of the Confrontation Clause for the same reason
that whether testimonial hearsay fits a hearsay exception, justified by reduced
hearsay dangers, is irrelevant.21 Under Crawford and its progeny, whether
testimonial hearsay is reliable—as previously shown by its qualification under
a firmly rooted hearsay exception22—has no bearing on its admissibility
without confrontation.23 The reliability argument for excluding nonassertive
conduct from the definition of hearsay can have no greater significance than

19. See Park, supra note 14, at 785 n.15. Park attributes the phrase ―hearsay dangers‖ to
Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L.
REV. 177 (1948). Morgan identified sincerity, misuse of language (sometimes called ambiguity or
narration), perception, and memory as the four ―dangers.‖ Id. at 185–88.
20. Meanwhile, proponents of the declarant-centered definition argue that the reduction of the
sincerity, memory, and perception dangers, if any, is overstated or counteracted by an increased
danger of ambiguity when the jury attempts to infer the declarant‘s beliefs from actions not intended
to communicate them. RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 450–51
(4th ed. 2006).
21. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2009) (admissibility without
confrontation turns on whether a particular statement is testimonial, not whether it fits a hearsay
exception, even one that usually encompasses non-testimonial statements); Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 61–64 (2004) (admitting reliable hearsay statements ―is fundamentally at odds with the
right of confrontation‖ because the clause ―is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee . . .
command[ing] . . . that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of
cross-examination‖).
22. The Court had previously held that the Confrontation Clause does not bar admission of a
non-testifying witness‘s statement against a criminal defendant if the statement possessed ―adequate
‗indicia of reliability.‘‖ Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). To meet that test, evidence was
required to either fall within a ―firmly rooted hearsay exception‖ or bear ―particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.‖ Id.
23. In overruling Roberts, the Crawford Court noted the problems with the previously
articulated test:
Although the results of our decisions have generally been faithful to the
original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the same cannot be said of our
rationales. Roberts conditions the admissibility of all hearsay evidence on
whether it falls under a ―firmly rooted hearsay exception‖ or bears
―particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.‖ This test departs from the
historical principles identified above in two respects. First, it is too broad: It
applies the same mode of analysis whether or not the hearsay consists of ex
parte testimony. This often results in close constitutional scrutiny in cases that
are far removed from the core concerns of the Clause. At the same time,
however, the test is too narrow: It admits statements that do consist of ex parte
testimony upon a mere finding of reliability. This malleable standard often fails
to protect against paradigmatic confrontation violations.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (internal citation omitted).
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the reliability argument for excusing confrontation when hearsay fits a firmly
rooted hearsay exception.
Federal Rule 801(a) defines ―statement‖ for purposes of the hearsay rule
as ―(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended . . . as an assertion.‖ This definition rejects the declarant-centered
definition.24 It excludes nonassertive conduct from hearsay even if that
conduct is used as a basis from which to infer a declarant‘s beliefs about facts
that the proponent seeks to prove with the evidence that the declarant believes
them.25 A classic example is evidence that a sea captain sailed with his family
after subjecting the ship to a thorough inspection, as proof that the vessel was
seaworthy.26 The authors of the Federal Rules decided that, although such
evidence implicated the captain‘s credibility and was subject to the hearsay
dangers of misperception, faulty memory, ambiguous narration and
insincerity, the reduced dangers associated with nonassertive conduct justified
its exclusion from hearsay.27
To the extent the sea captain did not intend to communicate to anyone the
seaworthiness of the vessel, his actions would likely show his sincere beliefs
about the condition of the ship. When intentionally communicating the
condition of the ship to another, he would decide whether to report sincerely,
creating the possibility that he chose to mislead. When acting upon, rather
than communicating, his belief, he will be sincere, except in the unlikely
event that he somehow lies to himself. Also, acting on his belief about the
ship‘s seaworthiness by risking the lives of himself and his family, the captain
is more likely to be careful about his perception and memory of the ship‘s
condition than he is when he merely reports the ship‘s condition to another.
Meanwhile, hearsay dangers remain. There is no certain way to determine
that the captain did not intend to communicate his belief about the ship, in
which case the danger of insincerity, although hidden, remains. Although his
conduct is not the type ordinarily thought of as intending an assertion, the
captain may have intended to dupe observers into thinking the ship was safe.
Perception and memory dangers also remain. The inspection may have
missed a flaw, or the captain may have misunderstood or forgotten the flaws
24. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
25. See id.
26. Park, supra note 14, at 789–90 (citing Wright v. Tatham, (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 516
(Exch. Div.) (Parke, B.)); EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 250, at 738 (3d ed.
1984); 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 267, at 103 (rev. ed.
1979).
27. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee‘s notes (―No class of evidence is free of the
possibility of fabrication, but the likelihood is less with nonverbal than with assertive verbal
conduct.‖); cf. Park, supra note 14, at 791 (―The literature . . . lacks any compelling evidence of
injustice done by receiving nonverbal conduct containing concealed assertions. The opponents of
nonverbal conduct have not found their Sir Walter Raleigh.‖).
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that made the ship unseaworthy. Moreover, that the conduct is nonassertive
may actually increase the narration danger because we infer the captain‘s
beliefs about the seaworthiness of the ship from actions that are ambiguous
precisely because the captain did not intend his actions to communicate those
beliefs. Perhaps leaving with his family after the inspection showed his belief
that the ship‘s many flaws made it an appropriate vehicle for teaching them
the perils of venturing to sea on a dangerous vessel.
The Federal Rules‘ advisory committee‘s notes make it perfectly clear that
the rule writers understood that they were exempting nonassertive conduct
from the definition of hearsay although such conduct required a judgment
about the declarant‘s credibility.28 The committee also applied a similar
argument to assertive conduct offered for some reason other than its intended
assertion, using the classic example provided in Wright v. Tatham.29 To help
establish the competency of a testator (Marsden), the beneficiary of his will
offered letters written to Marsden in language and about matters that
suggested the writers‘ belief that Marsden was a person of ordinary
understanding and thus competent to write his will.30 The beneficiary did not
offer the letters for the truth of their intended assertions about what they
reported—news of mutual friends, descriptions of an author‘s travels, a
request that Marsden settle a legal dispute, and an offer to remain in a post to
which Marsden had appointed the writer—but rather as a basis for inferring
the writers‘ beliefs that Marsden was capable of understanding and
responding to their letters. Though the advisory committee acknowledged
that the Court of the Exchequer Chamber excluded the letters as hearsay, the
committee rejected that result to the extent that the letter writers
unintentionally revealed—rather than intentionally asserted—their belief in
Marsden‘s competency. Were the letter writers acting on their belief in the
testator‘s mental state while having no intention to communicate that belief,
the evidence would be subject to the same reduced hearsay dangers that
accompany nonassertive conduct.
The Wright court confusingly called the letters ―implied statements.‖31 The
label elided indirect, though intended, assertions—matters the declarant left to
28.
29.
30.
31.

FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee‘s notes.
Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. at 488–89.
Id. at 489.
Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. at 516–17. The Wright court wrote:

[P]roof of a particular fact, which is not of itself a matter in issue, but which is
relevant only as implying a statement or opinion of a third person on the matter
in issue, is inadmissible in all cases where such a statement or opinion not on
oath would be of itself inadmissible.
Id. Before the advent of the Federal Rules, courts considered such implied assertions to be hearsay.
See, e.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 442 (1949); United States v. Pacelli, 491 F.2d
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implication, though intentionally communicated—with beliefs unintentionally
revealed while the speaker intentionally asserts something else.32 Wright‘s
holding addresses only the situation where the declarant‘s beliefs are inferred,
but not intentionally asserted, because the assertion-centered definition already
encompasses intentional assertions, however indirect or even cryptic.33
Nonetheless, confusion about the scope of ―implied statements‖ led some courts
to read the Federal Rules‘ rejection of Wright to allow indirect, intended
assertions to escape the hearsay definition; this is a result for which nobody
offered justification.34 In turn, this created distrust of the Federal Rules‘
hearsay definition deep enough to cause some courts and commentators to
question whether they should not interpret the Federal Rules‘ assertion-centered
approach as no narrower than Wright‘s declarant-centered approach.35
Nonetheless, Professor Roger Park, in a 1990 article, set things straight.
Park clearly explained the difference between the properly understood
definitions and isolated several categories of evidence where the different
definitions spawned different results despite some courts and commentators‘
contrary wishes. Park defended the Federal Rules‘ approach against other
commentators‘ attempts to restore the hearsay definition to its pre-Federal
Rules‘ condition.36
This Article‘s thesis does not require us to enter the debate about which
approach is preferable because the occasion for revisiting the contrasting
definitions is to decide the scope of the historically determined confrontation
right, and not the policy-determined hearsay definition. Nonetheless,
Professor Park‘s description of evidence for which the definitions make a
difference provides a useful template for post-Crawford cases in which courts
applying the assertion-centered definition deviated from the common law. In
so doing, those courts exempt from confrontation evidence whose probative
value depends upon an absent declarant‘s credibility.
Under the Federal Rules, perhaps the most important category of nonhearsay that raises a confrontation problem is that of false statements uttered
1108, 1115–17 (2d Cir. 1974); Favre v. Henderson, 464 F.2d 359, 362 (5th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Williamson, 450 F.2d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 1971).
32. Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76
MINN. L. REV. 367, 419 n.153 (1992).
33. Park, supra note 14, at 800 (the assertion-based definition incorporates all facts that a
speaker intended to communicate, whether directly or indirectly).
34. Id. at 794–801 (discussing misuses of the assertion-based definition). Stoddard v. State
illustrates almost all these misuses by arguing that questions, commands, and statements of fact
requiring a ―multi-step inferential process‖ from the fact asserted to the proposition for whose truth
the statement is offered cannot be hearsay. 850 A.2d 406, 410–26 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), rev‟d,
887 A.2d 564 (Md. 2005).
35. Park, supra note 14, at 787 n.20.
36. See id.
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to investigators by a defendant‘s associate which the prosecution offers to
show the declarant‘s knowledge that the defendant is guilty.37 Such cases
occur frequently, and because courts properly find the evidence to be nonhearsay under the assertion-centered definition, they improperly deny
defendants their right to confront the declarants. In this circumstance,
declarants unintentionally reveal their knowledge of the defendant‘s guilt
while intending to communicate something exculpatory, which the
government then proves is false. When persons who are aware of the
defendant‘s criminal involvement (or lack thereof) speak falsely to mislead
investigators, courts rightly conceive these statements as non-hearsay under
Federal Rule 801. Occasionally, courts make the proper argument: such
statements are assertive conduct offered for a purpose other than their
intended assertions and therefore fall outside the Federal Rules‘ assertioncentered definition of hearsay.38 Unfortunately, courts more frequently follow
a poorly reasoned Supreme Court case, Anderson v. United States.39 There,
the Court confusedly analyzed false statement evidence revealing a
declarant‘s unsuccessfully disguised beliefs of his and the defendant‘s guilt—
hearsay under the declarant-centered, but not the assertion-centered
definition—as if it were not hearsay under any definition because it was not
offered to prove the truth of any matter believed by the declarant.40 In
37. Id. at 814–16 (citing White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603–04 (9th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Candoli, 870 F.2d 496, 507–08 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Munson, 819 F.2d 337, 339–40
(1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Hackett, 638 F.2d 1179, 1186–87 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1353–54 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Weaver, 565 F.2d 129, 135–36
(8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kelly, 551 F.2d 760, 764–65 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Cusumano, 429 F.2d 378, 381 (2d Cir. 1970)). After Crawford, admission of the statements in each
of these cases without confrontation would violate the Confrontation Clause.
38. Park, supra note 14, at 836–37.
[C]ourts seem to have used the concepts of nonassertive conduct, and of
assertive conduct offered to prove something other than the matter asserted, in a
manner consistent with the Advisory Committee‘s theory that sincerity dangers
are lessened. The cases generally involve utterances classed as non-hearsay that
raise no real insincerity dangers affecting the purpose for which they are being
used. . . . It is unlikely that codefendants who made false statements
exculpating their accomplices were hoping to incriminate their accomplices.
Id.
39. 417 U.S. 211 (1974).
40. Id. at 219–20. Professor Park explains that Anderson has little precedential value because
of ―the obscure way the Court stated the facts and . . . the Court‘s apparent belief that it was using the
statement in a way that involved no reliance on credibility and hence no need for cross-examination.‖
Park, supra note 14, at 815 & n.175. Nonetheless, other courts have repeated its error. See, e.g.,
Hackett, 638 F.2d at 1186 (arguing that false statements to prove consciousness of guilt ―were
admitted not for their truth, but merely for the fact that the statements were made‖). By contrast, that
beliefs unintentionally revealed by false statements were hearsay under the declarant-centered
definition was forcibly argued in Lyle v. Koehler, 720 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1983). In that case, the
declarant solicited false testimony providing himself and an accomplice with a false alibi. Id.
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Anderson, the Court received a declarant‘s false statements made to cover up
the crime and used against an accomplice to show consciousness of their joint
guilt.41 Yet, when used to show the truth of what the declarant thought, the
false statement was clearly hearsay under the declarant-centered definition
because it implicated the speaker‘s credibility.42
When the question is whether the evidence is hearsay under the Federal
Rules, the correct rubric for deciding that the false statement evidence is not
hearsay does not matter, except perhaps to law professors. But when the issue
is whether the Constitution requires confrontation, it makes all the difference.
Applying the correct analysis shows that while the evidence is not hearsay
under the assertion-based definition, it is hearsay under the common law‘s
declarant-centered view, thereby implicating the declarant‘s credibility and
thus triggering the defendant‘s confrontation right. A Massachusetts appeals
court in the recent case of Commonwealth v. Pelletier43 seemed to suspect as
much. In Pelletier, the court cited Anderson, while holding that a wife‘s false
statement that she received her injuries when she fell down the stairs, offered
against her defendant-husband accused of battery, was not hearsay and raised
no confrontation issue because the prosecution did not offer it for its truth.44
The court qualified its ruling by noting that the defendant had not argued in
his brief that the statement was ―implied hearsay,‖ so under Massachusetts
appellate procedure, there was no need to address that issue or ―the extent to
which the principles of the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause are
coextensive.‖45 The court‘s disclaimer indicated that it understood that the
prosecution‘s offer of the statements to show them false did not determine
whether they were hearsay under the declarant-centered definition when the
prosecution proved their falsity to show the declarant‘s knowledge of the
defendant‘s guilt. It simply will not do to suggest, as did the court in United
States v. Trala,46 that Crawford does not apply to a declarant‘s false
statements when offered to show his knowledge of the defendant‘s guilt
Although one might argue that the defendant‘s guilt was intentionally asserted by the declarant‘s
request for the false alibi (rather than by the declarant‘s simply providing the defendant with one),
the court assumed that the request unintentionally revealed the defendant‘s guilt. Id. Nonetheless,
the court found the statement hearsay and its admission a violation of the Confrontation Clause. Id.
41. 417 U.S. at 219–20.
42. Id. at 220; see also Park, supra note 14, at 801 & n.79 (false statements as evidence of
consciousness of guilt require a judgment about the declarant‘s credibility).
43. 879 N.E.2d 125 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008).
44. Id. The court carefully noted that the ―wife‘s statement was not being offered to prove the
truth of anything asserted therein,‖ reserving the question of whether the statement was nonetheless
―implied hearsay‖ when offered for the truth of beliefs that she had not intended to assert. Id. at 130
& n.6 (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. 386 F.3d 536, 544–45 (3d Cir. 2004).
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―because the reliability of testimonial evidence is not at issue.‖47 That is
plainly false. At the very least, the declarant‘s perception, memory, and
narration, and thus credibility, are squarely implicated when the prosecution
uses false statement evidence in this fashion. Also, the reduction in the
sincerity danger is only as good as our estimate that the declarant was not
deviously intending to inculpate the defendant by falsely exculpating him.
The Pelletier court sensed the correct issues, while avoiding them for
procedural reasons, but other courts have simply deprived defendants of their
confrontation right without realizing the error of conflating the scope of the
Federal Rules‘ assertion-centered hearsay definition and the confrontation
right. For example, in United States. v. Brown,48 the government offered the
statement of Brown‘s co-defendant, Giles, to airport police explaining his
possession of $23,000 in cash as the profits of his barbershop that he intended
to use for the purchase of a vehicle.49 The government proved the statement
false, while offering it against Brown, who was traveling with Giles and was
also in possession of a large amount of cash.50 The court held that Giles‘s
statement was not hearsay, and thus did not raise any confrontation issue,
because it was not ―introduced for the truth of the matter asserted, but to show
that he was lying.‖51 Still, it was not hearsay only under the assertioncentered definition because the prosecution did not offer it for the truth of the
intended assertion, that is, that the money was barbershop profits to be used to
buy a car.52 The prosecution did prove the lie to show the truth of the
declarant‟s belief that the source and purpose of the cash that Brown and
Giles were carrying needed to be hidden from the police because the cash‘s
source and purpose were illegal. Under the declarant-centered definition, the
lie was clearly hearsay because the prosecution offered it for the truth of
Giles‘s belief that they needed a false explanation for the drug money,
although his lie unintentionally revealed that belief, rather than intentionally
asserted it.
Similarly in United States v. Thompson,53 the court held that admission of
two declarants‘ false statements about paying a contractor for paving their
driveway raised no hearsay or Confrontation Clause issues despite the
statements having been made to (and recorded by) police and then repeated in
the grand jury.54 The government introduced the evidence to show that
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 544.
560 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 765.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Crim. No. 07-35-GFVT, 2009 WL 331478 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2009).
Id.
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―county-purchased materials were being used to improve private property,‖
and, ultimately, to prove that the defendants were guilty of misappropriating
government property by arranging to pave the declarants‘ driveway.55
Although the government plainly used the declarants‘ beliefs that they had no
right to the materials to prove that the declarants did not own them, the court
erroneously reasoned that ―there is no need to assess the credibility of the
declarant of a false statement‖ and so ―the Confrontation [C]lause is not
implicated.‖56 By now, it should be apparent why that is wrong. The
statements‘ probative value depended upon the accuracy of the declarants‘
belief that they were not entitled to use these materials (implicating perception
and memory dangers) and on the accuracy of the inference that lying about
paying for the paving showed guilty knowledge of the materials‘ ownership
rather than something else (implicating narration dangers).
Finally, in United States v. Blake,57 the government proved that the
defendant‘s wife had told police during a search that money found in the
Blakes‘ safe had come from the sale of electronics equipment.58 The court
allowed this statement to be used against the defendant because it was not
―offered for the truth of the matter asserted (that the money came from
electronics sales), but, rather, to show that the Blakes‘ inconsistent answers to
the questions about the money supported the government‘s claim that the
money came from the sale of illegal drugs.‖59 That inference required the jury
to find Mrs. Blake‘s explanation false, implicating Mr. Blake with her
knowledge that he needed a phony explanation for the source of the drug
money.60 Again, the court conflated the Federal Rules hearsay and
Confrontation Clause questions, finding no Confrontation Clause issue
because the evidence was not hearsay under Federal Rule 801.
False statements made to police are particularly important examples of
nonassertive hearsay because their status as testimonial seems clear. Indeed,
if a declarant‘s credibility defines the scope of the Confrontation Clause, the
only way to avoid the conclusion that Crawford does not require courts to use
a declarant-centered definition of hearsay would be to argue that, by happy
coincidence, all evidence excluded from hearsay by the ―intent to assert‖
requirement is not testimonial. That possibility is remote, though not
impossible. If the Supreme Court were eventually to find that testimonial
statements encompass only those in which a declarant intended to

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *4.
284 F. App‘x 530 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 541.
See id.
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communicate the facts that the prosecution offered the statements to prove,
then the definition of ―testimonial‖ would exclude the same evidence
excluded from hearsay by the assertion-centered test. But the Court has not
yet applied, or even suggested, such a narrow view of what is testimonial.
Thus far, to determine whether a declarant‘s statements are testimonial,
courts have focused upon such formulations as whether the statement was
made ―under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial‖ or, if
made in response to police interrogation, whether circumstances ―objectively
indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.‖61 These
definitions render it nearly certain that the declarants‘ statements in all the
false statement cases are testimonial, although meeting only the declarantcentered definition of hearsay. The declarants knew very well that they were
making statements that could be used prosecutorially and would be available
for use in a subsequent trial. Moreover, the primary purpose of the
questioning to which they responded was to discover past events potentially
relevant to criminal prosecution. The only questions are whether it matters
that the declarants did not anticipate the statements would be used in the way
the prosecution seeks to use them, or whether they did not intend the
statements to be inculpatory at all. The Court‘s recent opinion in MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts,62 where it held that the Sixth Amendment requires
confrontation of a police chemist who prepared a report showing that the
substance possessed by the defendant was cocaine, strongly suggests that
neither factor is determinative.63
First, the Court rejected the argument that statements need be
―accusatory‖ to be testimonial.64 When the prosecution offers a declarant‘s
statements for their truth, the declarant is a witness against the defendant,
even though the substance of the statements is hardly necessary to convict.65
According to the Court, the Constitution contemplates only two categories of
witness: those against and those in favor of the defendant. There is no ―third
category of witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, but somehow immune from
61. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004); see also Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531–33 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 813 (2006);
United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 187–92 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920,
923–24 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 21 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v.
Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 358–60 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 673–74
(6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228–29 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Mills,
446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1121–22 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
62. 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2542 (2009).
63. See id.
64. Id. at 2533–34.
65. See id. at 2534.
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confrontation‖ because the evidence the witness provides is insufficiently
inculpatory or his relationship with the defendant is not adversarial.66 Under
Melendez-Diaz, if the prosecution offered a chemist‘s report saying that a
tested sample belonging to a person other than the defendant was negative for
contraband to rebut the defendant‘s suggestion that it contaminated the
defendant‘s sample with illegal drugs, the report would be no less hearsay
than that of the original chemist‘s statement that the defendant‘s sample tested
positive for illegal drugs.
Second, there is no suggestion that because a witness may unwittingly
spill the beans, whether in response to police interrogation or when
voluntarily speaking to investigators in an attempt to mislead them, the
statements made during the attempt to mislead are not testimonial.67 The
Court said, ―[C]onfrontation is designed to weed out not only the fraudulent
[witness], but the incompetent one as well.‖68 Thus, even if nonassertive
conduct raises no sincerity danger, confrontation is nonetheless required to
probe the witness‘s other testimonial capacities and to expose unreliable
testimony of all stripes.
Finally, given the Court‘s repeated description of grand jury testimony
and affidavits as core instances of testimonial statements, it is hard to imagine
how they become non-testimonial when offered to prove something that the
declarant did not intend to assert.69 It seems no more likely that the Court
would find statements made to police and in the grand jury not testimonial
because the speaker unwittingly revealed damaging information about the
defendant, than it would hold that a witness was not testifying when he did the
same thing in court. Routine instructions tell jurors to evaluate not only what
witnesses say, but how they say it.70 What is demeanor evidence if not a

66. Id. Even if there were a requirement that the statements be sufficiently inculpatory, false
statements will often meet it because, however unintentionally, they provide damning proof.
67. Id. at 2535 (―[N]o authority . . . hold[s] that a person who volunteers his testimony is any
less a witness against the defendant than one who is responding to interrogation.‖) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
68. Id. at 2537.
69. Id. at 2531–32 (affidavits and prior testimony are testimonial).
70. See, e.g., 4 LEONARD SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL
§ 76.01 (2007) (Instruction 76-1).
How do you determine where the truth lies? You watched each witness testify.
Everything a witness said or did on the witness stand counts in your
determination. How did the witness impress you? Did he appear to be frank,
forthright and candid, or evasive and edgy as if hiding something? How did the
witness appear; what was his demeanor—that is, his carriage, behavior, bearing,
manner and appearance while testifying? Often it is not what a person says but
how he says it that moves us.
Id.
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series of verbal and nonverbal clues that reveal, often unwittingly, what the
witness actually believes? What a witness lets slip is as much a part of his
live testimony as that which he intends to communicate, and seeing why it
should or how it could be otherwise with out-of-court statements is
exceedingly difficult.71
A second important category of nonassertive conduct is illustrated by
United States v. Zenni.72 In that classic case, the court admitted evidence that,
while searching the premises of an alleged bookmaker, the police received
calls in which anonymous callers attempted to place bets.73 Relying on the
Federal Rules‘ rejection of Wright v. Tatham, under which the calls would be
declarant-centered hearsay,74 the Zenni court determined that they were not
hearsay under the assertion-based definition. Many courts have followed suit,
though Zenni is not without its critics.75
At one point, the court treated the case as though the calls trying to place
bets were pure nonassertive conduct equivalent to the ship captain‘s actions,

71. The entire notion of ―testimonial‖ hearsay is built on the idea that the Constitution requires
like treatment of witnesses who testify against the defendant at trial and those who ―bear testimony‖
against the defendant in out-of-court statements.
72. 492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
73. Id. at 465.
74. The Zenni court was prescient about the hearsay status of such calls under the common law.
In Regina v. Kearley, [1992] 2 AC 228 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.), relying on Wright,
the House of Lords found anonymous calls ordering drugs on premises being searched by police to
be hearsay. In 2003, Parliament enacted comprehensive hearsay reform whose effect was to exclude
such calls from the definition of hearsay. See infra note 113.
75. See, e.g., State v. Kutz, 2003 WI App 205, ¶¶ 45–46, 671 N.W.2d 660. Believing that the
bettors implicitly intended to assert that bets were taken on the premises, the court wrote:
[W]e are not persuaded by the analysis in Zenni . . . because that analysis
assumes without explanation that an assertion does not include an intended
expression of a fact, opinion, or condition if it is implicit in the words used.
Moreover, the court in Zenni acknowledged that some utterances might be
intended as an assertion even though the ―words [were] non-assertive in form‖
and such utterances would require a preliminary determination of intent: for
example, an airport security inspector that says ―go on through‖ to a passenger
after using a metal detector on them might intend to assert that the passenger did
not have a gun. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. at 469 n.21. We also observe that, even
when treatises describe the rule in federal courts to be that implicit assertions
are not hearsay, they often point out exceptions. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra [note 25], § 250, at 111–12 n.29 (noting in a footnote, that
when the utterance ―it will stop raining in an hour‖ is offered to prove it is
raining, that is hearsay, because ―the fact to be proved is a necessary implication
of the utterance‖).
We conclude that the preferable approach is to include within the meaning
of ―assertion‖ in Wis. Stat. § 908.01(1) an expression of a fact, opinion, or
condition that is implicit in the words of an utterance as long as the speaker
intended to express that fact, opinion, or condition.
Id.
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stating that ―the utterance, ‗Put $2 to win on Paul Revere in the third at
Pimlico,‘ is a direction and not an assertion of any kind, and therefore can be
neither true nor false.‖76 The analysis ignored the way in which virtually all
communication has some intended assertion associated with it, which should
cause us to understand the utterance above to assert, ―I want to place a $2 bet
with you on Paul Revere in the third at Pimlico.‖77 Read that way, the caller
is effectively asserting his belief that bets are taken on the premises at the
same time that the act of calling and placing the bet is (perhaps)
unintentionally revealing the same thing.78 That does not necessarily make
the evidence hearsay under the Federal Rules, but it puts it in the more
problematic category of ―assertive conduct not offered for its intended
assertion,‖ like the conduct in Wright.79
Properly analyzed, Zenni is more problematic than the false statement
cases where the beliefs revealed and asserted by the declarant‘s words are
effective opposites, offering an assurance that, when we use the words to
establish inferences from their falsity, they are free of any intent to assert. In
contrast, when we use the calls to show the callers‘ beliefs that gambling
occurs on the premises, but not their desire to place a bet, we cannot be nearly
so sure that the inference is free of an intent to assert the beliefs we are using
it to prove. This has moved some courts to find the calls hearsay, even under
the Federal Rules, after weighing the extent to which the callers‘ beliefs about
the premises are unintentionally revealed versus intentionally asserted.
Nonetheless, most courts have opted to call this type of evidence nonhearsay under the Federal Rules‘ assertion-centered definition, raising the
possibility that confrontation is nonetheless required because the proof is
hearsay under the declarant-centered view. In many cases, such evidence will
not be testimonial because the callers will not know that they are speaking to
authorities or, if they do, will be unlikely to place bets or ask for drugs. But in
other cases, such calls can be testimonial. Weems v. State provides a recent
example of how this can occur.80 In Weems, several persons approached a
residence where narcotics officers were executing a search warrant and asked
for the defendant by his nickname. The court held that the requests to see the

76. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. at 466 n.7.
77. Elsewhere, the Zenni court acknowledged that the callers‘ unstated belief that bets were
taken at that number was excluded from hearsay only if they did not intend to communicate their
belief. Id. at 468–69 & n.21.
78. Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick profitably discuss Zenni and similar borderland
problems as cases of ―mixed act and assertion‖ requiring judges to weigh the conduct‘s performative
and assertive aspects. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE:
PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 8.22 (3d ed. 2009).
79. Park, supra note 14, at 800–01.
80. 673 S.E.2d 50 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
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defendant were ―verbal acts not introduced for their truth but rather to connect
Weems to the residence and the cocaine seized from that location.‖81 The
court went on to say that the verbal act designation also meant that there was
no Confrontation Clause violation because ―the Clause does not bar the
admission of statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the
matter asserted.‖82
Such evidence is hearsay under the declarant-centered view even if it is
not hearsay under the assertion-centered definition because the declarants
were mostly revealing, not asserting, their beliefs that the defendant could be
found there. Either way, the probative value of their statements clearly
depends upon their credibility. Any residual confusion about whether such
evidence would be hearsay under the declarant-centered view follows from
the Weems court‘s confusing use of the term ―verbal act‖ for assertive conduct
offered for a purpose other than its intended assertion.
The term ―verbal act‖ is better reserved for evidence that is not hearsay
because its occurrence is probative despite the actor‘s beliefs.83 A classic
example is a statement assenting to a contract while the speaker secretly
refuses to be bound. Where the law makes the speaker‘s verbalized assent
probative on the issue of whether he concluded a binding contract, despite his
unexpressed reservations, the assent is a verbal act. A true verbal act is
relevant merely by virtue of its having been spoken and is not hearsay under
either the assertion-centered or declarant-centered definitions. In Weems,
however, asking for the defendant at a particular location is probative of the
fact that he can be found there because it shows the declarant‘s belief that the
defendant can be found there. Unlike the classic verbal act, the probative
value of the proof depends on the declarant‘s credibility, implicating, at the
least, his perception and memory that the defendant hangs out there. The
proof is not exempted from hearsay because it is a verbal act making the truth
of any matter irrelevant. It is not hearsay only under the assertion-centered
view because the declarant‘s beliefs about the defendant‘s whereabouts are
not intentionally asserted, but rather unintentionally revealed by the declarant
asking for him there.
Weems was not entirely clear about whether the persons asking for the
defendant by his nickname knew they were speaking to police. At one point,
the court described steps that the officers took to disguise themselves on the
81. Id. at 54.
82. Id. at 53 n.2.
83. Park, supra note 14, at 833. Professor Park notes that the term ―verbal act‖ is
unobjectionable if it is reserved for circumstances when the act of uttering words has legal
consequences. The label creates problems, however, when courts use it to refer to verbal conduct
that is not hearsay because it is nonassertive, but is not legally operative language. Such conduct
involves hearsay dangers. Id.
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premises, which resulted in their arresting several persons who came to the
door asking for drugs and the defendant.84 But when the court analyzed the
statements of the persons asking for the defendant, it made no reference to the
requests for drugs.85 This suggests that some of the callers arriving at the door
may have arrived after the police revealed themselves and simply asked for
the defendant without revealing their (possibly illegal) purpose. Even if these
were not the facts of Weems, this scenario clearly illustrates how we can
expect declarants in cases besides the false statement cases to engage in
nonassertive conduct that implicates defendants, even in the presence of
police. Similar cases will undoubtedly include those where the speakers know
that they are talking to police because the nonassertive conduct that connects a
defendant to illegality need not inculpate the speaker. Asking for Weems by
nickname associates him with the location at which the drugs were found,
despite whether the visitors gave any reason at all for coming, or innocently
identified themselves as there to, say, chat about the Yankees or take the
defendant to tea.
Like the false statements, the nonassertive conduct associating the
defendant with the drug location is not exempt from being testimonial because
the prosecution uses it in unanticipated ways or because it is not accusatory,
sufficiently inculpatory, or adversarial.86 But there is a difference that may
matter. The actors whose conduct connects the defendant to illegality are less
likely to anticipate that they are giving evidence at all, even if their actions are
knowingly undertaken in the presence of police. The declarants of false
statements are fully aware that they are providing information to the
authorities that they may use as evidence, making that information the
functional equivalent of live testimony.
The statements associating a person with illegality that fit the nonassertive
conduct rubric are harder to conceive as functional testimony. The declarant
of such nonassertive conduct, like the declarant who asks the police for
Weems, should not be thinking at all about providing evidence. If a person is
aware that he is potentially providing evidence to the police, rather than just
acting in their presence, his statement should probably no longer qualify as
nonassertive conduct. It thus remains an open question whether the Court will
want to make clear that the inquiry into whether a declarant would understand
that statements made to police can be ―used prosecutorially‖ and ―would be
available for use in a subsequent trial‖ should include an inquiry into whether

84. Weems, 673 S.E.2d at 52.
85. Id. at 53–54.
86. See supra notes 61–68 and accompanying text.
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the declarant likely understood that he was providing evidence at all.87
Nonetheless, the central point remains that the Weems court never asked
whether Weems‘s visitors‘ statements were testimonial because it erroneously
assumed that the assertion-centered definition of hearsay determined the
extent of Weems‘s confrontation right.
Some statements that courts find fit the mold of non-hearsay ―connecting‖
statements will undoubtedly remain testimonial. Washington v. McKinney
provides an example.88 The defendant was charged with dealing drugs. She
admitted using, but denied dealing, drugs. She instead claimed that her
boyfriend, who used her cell phone, was dealing. 89 While detaining
McKinney, the police had answered a call on her cell phone in which Crystal
Donovan complained that she had been waiting for McKinney to bring her
drugs in the parking lot outside a hotel.90 After receiving Donovan‘s
description, the officer who had answered the phone offered to bring the
drugs.91 Subsequently, a uniformed officer approached Donovan in the
parking lot.92 Donovan volunteered to the officer that she was there to meet
McKinney, whom she described as her friend.93 When the officer asked
Donovan why she was meeting McKinney, she said first, that she was going
to give McKinney a ride, and later, that she wanted to hang out with her.94
The court held that Donovan‘s statements were not hearsay because they were
not offered for their truth, but rather to show ―that Donovan knew McKinney
and that McKinney was nearby at the Sunrise Motel.‖95 The court further
held that since Donovan‘s statements were not offered for their truth, there
was no Confrontation Clause issue.96

87. Other circumstances raising this issue include the flight or suicide of the subject of an
investigation, or his destruction of evidence, when the subject knows that the police are investigating
him. Courts have admitted these actions as nonassertive conduct revealing the subject‘s knowledge
of the unlawful nature of the activities for which he was being investigated or the incriminating
nature of the materials destroyed, which knowledge may then be admissible against others connected
to those activities or materials. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Colson, 490 A.2d 811, 824 (Pa. 1985)
(suicide of defendant‘s accomplice admissible against defendant). In these cases, the declarants
surely know that their actions will become known to police and thus available for use in a subsequent
trial, but they may have no immediate awareness that they are providing evidence when they
undertake their actions.
88. Nos. 58201-1-I, 58202-0-I, 2007 WL 2297111, at *1–3 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007)
(per curiam).
89. Id. at *3.
90. Id. at *2.
91. Id. at *4.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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One can debate whether using the statements for Donovan‘s knowledge of
McKinney and McKinney‘s nearby location—potentially important to
determine whether McKinney was actually the source of the drugs or a foil for
her boyfriend—was hearsay under the Federal Rules‘ definition.97 But Zenni
itself is debatable, as are many close questions at the border created by the
assertion-centered view‘s distinction between beliefs that are unintentionally
revealed and those that are indirectly, though intentionally, asserted.98
However, the issue is not whether the McKinney court decided the hearsay
question correctly under the Federal Rules. It is whether it denied the
defendant her confrontation right by erroneously assuming the applicability of
the assertion-based definition to the Confrontation Clause. In this case, the
statements ―connecting‖ McKinney to Donovan and the Sunrise Hotel were
clearly testimonial, having been made to a uniformed officer in response to
his inquiries into drug activity.99 Donovan‘s credibility was implicated even
when her statements were used only to show that Donovan knew McKinney
and that she was nearby.100 Like all testimonial, declarant-centered hearsay,
the statement triggered McKinney‘s confrontation right unless there is a
special reason why the Confrontation Clause exempts it.
As with false exculpatory statements, ―connecting‖ statements often
escape confrontation scrutiny because courts confuse nonassertive conduct
with statements that are not offered for their truth. The primrose path to
erroneously admitting testimonial, nonassertive conduct in this manner is
illustrated by United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez.101 The court admitted ten
calls requesting heroin received on the defendant‘s seized cell phone to
―support an inference that Rodriguez was . . . dealing heroin.‖102 It
erroneously held that the calls to Rodriguez were not hearsay because the
inference from their being placed to his involvement ―[did] not depend on the
callers‘ truthfulness, memory, or perception.‖103 It claimed that the calls were
probative merely because they were made, despite the truth of the ―declarants‘
97. Donovan‘s responses to the officer‘s questions went beyond the acts of requesting or
buying drugs in the earlier calls and are therefore arguably not covered by Zenni‘s rationale that the
declarant was performing an act rather than intentionally communicating something.
98. For example, the court in McKinney admitted Donovan‘s call to McKinney‘s cell phone in
which she had complained of ―‗waiting for over 20 minutes for her shit from [McKinney],‘‖ and
another call in which the caller said that McKinney ―had [taken her boyfriend‘s] ‗stuff‘ and ‗was now
selling [it].‘‖ 2007 WL 2297111, at *2. Admitting these statements to show McKinney‘s
involvement in selling, but not for their literal truth, stretches, if not obliterates, the limits of Zenni,
or perhaps illustrates why Zenni was wrongly decided in the first instance.
99. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
100. McKinney, 2007 WL 2297111, at *2–4.
101. 565 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2009).
102. Id. at 315.
103. Id.
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belief that the defendant could supply the desired heroin.‖104 On that analysis,
however, the calls were admissible without confrontation even if government
agents intentionally orchestrated them for the express purpose of generating
evidence for use at trial. One hoped that if such a case arose, the court would
immediately realize that calls of this type are probative of the defendant‘s
involvement only if offered to show the truth of the declarants‘ beliefs that the
defendant is involved. Thus, the government-generated calls are testimonial
hearsay requiring confrontation, if they are admissible at all, and the
independently initiated calls are admissible without confrontation only
because they are non-testimonial, nonassertive conduct, and not because their
probative value is independent of the callers‘ credibility.
Such hope, however, was dashed in United States v. Cesareo-Ayala.105
The court held that monitored calls made to the defendant by Mendez, a
recently arrested coconspirator, were not testimonial hearsay although
requested and supervised by government agents. Among other things,
Mendez told Cesareo-Ayala that Mendez had his money from an earlier sale
and needed to get more drugs from him to sell.106 The court held that the calls
were not hearsay requiring confrontation because Mendez‘s testimonial
capacities were not implicated when the calls were considered as proof of
their business relationship rather than for any implicit assertion made for the
―benefit of the officers.‖107 That analysis would undoubtedly be true if
Mendez‘s statements were adopted by Cesareo-Ayala during the call, and
hence admissible pursuant to Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(B) as Cesareo-Ayala‘s
adopted admissions. But the court essentially disavowed this rubric when it
analogized the calls to those in Rodriguez-Lopez where the defendant never
participated.108 Apparently, the Cesareo-Ayala jury had never been instructed
to consider Mendez‘s statements only insofar as Cesareo-Ayala‘s responses
―manifested an adoption or belief in [their] truth.‖109 Thus, to avoid the
confrontation requirement, the court held that Mendez‘s statements, like those
in Rodriguez-Lopez, could stand alone because they were somehow probative
apart from their truth.110
Nonetheless, the analysis is similarly flawed. Apart from anything that
Cesareo-Ayala said in response, the probative value of Mendez‘s attempts to
104. Id.
105. 576 F.3d 1120 (10th Cir. 2009).
106. Id. at 1129–30.
107. Id. at 1129.
108. Officers intercepted the calls. Id.
109. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
110. Concurring, Judge Kelly noted that the court‘s faulty non-hearsay analysis invited
collision with Crawford; he would have acknowledged constitutional error, but found it harmless.
United States v. Cesareo-Ayala, 576 F.3d 1120, 1131–32 (Kelly, J., concurring).
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pay Cesareo-Ayala for drugs already received from him, and to obtain more
drugs from him to sell, depended entirely on the truth of Mendez‘s belief that
Cesareo-Ayala was Mendez‘s supplier. Moreover, those statements, made at
the urging of police to obtain evidence against Cesareo-Ayala, were clearly
testimonial. Even assuming that they were properly admitted as non-hearsay,
nonassertive conduct, their admission—like admission of the statements in
McKinney—violated the defendant‘s confrontation right unless there is
historical evidence showing that only assertion-based hearsay triggered the
right to confront an absent declarant at the time of the Founding.
III. CONFRONTATION OF NONASSERTIVE CONDUCT AT THE FOUNDING
Rather than defining the scope of the confrontation right by reference to
the reliability concerns informing hearsay policy, Crawford defines the scope
of the requirement by reference to common law rules governing admissibility
of testimonial hearsay at the time of the Constitution‘s adoption.111 History
requires using the declarant-centered hearsay definition, however
inconvenient. Before twentieth-century critiques resulted in the Federal
Rules‘ revision of the hearsay definition to encompass only intended
assertions, the common law employed the declarant-centered definition.
Wright v. Tatham, decided in 1837 and affirmed in 1838,112 pronounced the
authoritative view of the common law on the subject. There, the Court of the
Exchequer Chamber held that a declarant‘s beliefs about facts unintentionally
revealed by the declarant‘s nonassertive conduct or by conduct not intended to
assert those beliefs amounted to ―implied statements,‖ and thus, constituted
hearsay.113 Although the Federal Rules rejected Wright in 1975 when Federal
Rule 801 narrowly defined ―statements‖ to include only intended assertions,
the declarant-centered view of Wright existed at the Founding. Under
Crawford, therefore, the declarant-centered definition of hearsay must
determine whether the Constitution requires confrontation.
Moreover, courts must require confrontation for nonassertive conduct
because the Supreme Court has held that declarants‘ statements that the
prosecution has not offered for their truth are exempt from confrontation only
111. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43–56 (2004).
112. (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Exch. Div.), aff‟d, (1838) 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L.).
113. 112 Eng. Rep. at 517. English courts continued to endorse that view, upholding Wright
against challenge in 1992. See R v. Kearley, [1992] 2 AC 228 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)
(U.K.). In 2003, Parliament enacted comprehensive hearsay reform whose effect, according to the
court in Regina v. Sukadeve Singh, [2006] EWCA Crim. 660, [2006] 2 Crim. App. 12, was to reverse
Kearley and, perhaps, entirely overrule Wright. Section 115 of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003
states that hearsay statements include matters stated only if ―the purpose, or one of the purposes, of
the person making the statement appears to the court to have been—(a) to cause another person to
believe the matter, or (b) to cause another person to act or a machine to operate on the basis that the
matter is as stated.‖ Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 115 (Eng.).
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because the declarants‘ credibility is irrelevant to the statements‘ probativity.
When the prosecution uses such conduct to infer the declarant‘s beliefs in
certain facts, which beliefs are then used to prove the existence of those facts,
the declarant‘s credibility is clearly relevant to the statements‘ probative
value. Simply wrong are courts that have equated statements offered for the
truth of beliefs that declarants did not intend to assert with statements that are
not hearsay by any definition because the prosecution has not offered them for
the truth of any beliefs held by the declarants, as even the proponents of the
assertion-centered definition embodied in Federal Rule 801 conceded.
The history contains no evidence that nonassertive conduct was
considered exempt from hearsay or from the common law‘s requirement of
confrontation. Letters similar to those at issue in Wright had been admitted in
the Ecclesiastical and Prerogative Courts—which handled civil cases without
a jury—but the Court of King‘s Bench, Court of Exchequer Chamber, and
House of Lords in Wright made clear that these cases established no precedent
for the common law courts in which such evidence had never been received.
Similarly, there was nothing in the definition of hearsay that today includes
the phrase ―truth of the matter asserted‖ that made the assertion-centered
approach an implicit part of Founding-era lawyers‘ conception of
hearsay/confrontation and from which the common law subsequently
departed. Similarly, there is no evidence that Founding-era lawyers
entertained a definition of ―statement‖ that excluded nonassertive conduct that
the Wright court overturned by including nonassertive conduct within the
ambit of implied statements governed by the hearsay rule and confrontation
requirements.
The Wright case serves as a useful guide for ascertaining how hearsay
would have been understood at the time of the Founding. Although decided
fifty years after the Constitution‘s framing, Wright was nothing if not
thoroughly litigated, and the key issue to the precedent-bound judges was
whether precedent excluded nonassertive conduct.114 Yet Sir Frederick
Pollock, the letters‘ proponent, conceded the nonexistence of common law
precedent for the proposition that letters sent to Marsden (the testator)—which
showed the writers‘ belief that he was capable of understanding matters
contained in the letters, and which, in turn, would show him possessed of the
capacity to write a will—were admissible.115 Noting precedent in the
Ecclesiastical and Prerogative Courts for receiving such letters on the issue of

114. The story of the entire litigation is well told in John M. Maguire, The Hearsay System:
Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741, 749–60 (1961).
115. Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. at 498 (―No instances have been found of decisions as to this kind
of evidence in the Courts of the Common Law.‖); see also id. at 511 (Bosanquet, J.) (―No precedent
has been referred to in which such evidence has been admitted upon a trial at law.‖).
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a testator‘s competency—where ―[i]t is usual . . . to plead that the person
whose sanity is in question was treated of a man of sound mind‖—Pollock
argued that ―the same rule (which is grounded in good sense) should . . .
prevail in both courts.‖116 Nonetheless, the judges unanimously rejected
Pollock‘s argument.117 Although some judges would have admitted the
letters, they would have done so only because they found sufficient reason to
believe that the testator had acted competently in response to those letters,
whose probative value would then lie in giving context to the actions that
suggested his sanity.118 Thus, even those judges who would have admitted the
letters did not believe they were competent evidence in common law courts of
the writers‘ beliefs about the testator‘s sanity, from which one could infer that
he was sane.119
The reasons for excluding the letters were exactly those one would expect.
The statements were not made under oath and were not subject to crossexamination.120 Moreover, the letters‘ potential reliability was insufficient

116. Id. at 498.
117. ―[N]one of the judges who participated in the final hearing of the case flatly committed
himself to the proposition that the three letters should have been admitted as falling outside the
hearsay area.‖ Maguire, supra note 114, at 755–56 (citing Lord Chancellor Cottenham in Wright v.
Tatham, (1838) 7 Eng. Rep. 559, 597 (H.L.)).
118. Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. at 508 (Gurney, B.); id. at 518–19 (Parke, B.) (reporting that there
was no difference among the judges on the principle that the letters were inadmissible as proof of the
declarants‘ belief in Marsden‘s sanity, but that some judges found sufficient basis to believe that
Marsden had acted ―with reference to the letters,‖ making them admissible to explain such acts, and
candidly conceded that if admitted for that purpose ―no rule of law could prevent their full effect
from being produced on the minds of the jury‖); see also Maguire, supra note 114, at 754–55.
119. At least one Prerogative Court Judge found that the decision of the Court of King‘s Bench
excluding the letters in Wright was no precedent for excluding them in Ecclesiastical and Prerogative
Courts. 112 Eng. Rep. at 498 (noting two unreported decisions by Sir Herbert Jenner, Commissary
of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury, in which Wright was cited ―without success‖).
120. Id. at 500 (Sir Cresswell, arguing for Tatham against admission) (―All the letters were
inadmissible, because they presented statements which could not be verified by oath, and subjected
to the test of cross-examination.‖); id. at 515 (Parke, B.) (―[T]hey are mere hearsay evidence,
statements of the writers, not on oath, of the truth of the matter in question.‖).
The administering of an oath furnishes some guarantee for the sincerity of the
opinion; and the power of cross-examination gives an opportunity of testing the
foundation and the value of it. Such being the general rule, it is necessary for
the party who brings forward evidence not on oath to show some recognised
exception to the general rule, within which it falls.
Id. at 506 (Coltman, J.).
If the writers of these letters were produced as witnesses and examined upon
oath, their opinion would be receivable in evidence, because the grounds of
their knowledge and the credibility of their testimony might be ascertained by
cross-examination; but I know of no rule by which the opinion, however clearly
expressed, of a person, however well informed, is receivable in evidence, unless
it be given in the course of legal examination.
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grounds from which to fashion a new exception, at least for judges who were
not inclined to do so. Arguing for Tatham and against admission of the
letters, Sir Cresswell stated the law as follows:
It is urged on the other side that such evidence ought to be
received, because it would, in the ordinary course of life, have
some effect on the mind; but that is a reason for excluding it,
if not legitimately entitled to attention according to general
rules. In a particular case the assertion, without oath, of a
respectable man might influence a reasonable mind; but the
rule, established for the safe administration of justice in
general, is, that evidence unconfirmed by oath, and not
subject to cross-examination, shall not be received.121
Responding specifically to the claim that ―the expressions in [the letters]
are not to be presumed ironical or insincere,‖122—an argument not unlike the
reduced sincerity danger made by the advisory committee for excluding such
proof from hearsay—Sir Cresswell responded, ―if the evidence were given in
the ordinary manner by witnesses, that point might be tried by crossexamination.‖123
The court also responded to the claim that nonassertive conduct was more
reliable because declarants act upon their beliefs rather than merely assert
them. Baron Parke rejected the distinction between merely asserting and
acting upon beliefs as a reason for excluding nonassertive conduct. He
reasoned that even assertive conduct, such as sending a letter claiming that the
testator was competent, ―affords an inference that such an act would not have
been done unless the statement was true, or believed to be true.‖124 As a
result, accepting the argument would lead to the ―indiscriminate admission of
hearsay evidence of all manner of facts.‖125 However wrongly one may think
that the judges responded to Sir Pollock‘s policy arguments, there was simply
no doubt that they agreed that the issue was one of altering the hearsay rules
with which they were familiar:
[I]t is clear that an acting to a much greater extent and degree
upon such statements . . . would not make the statements
admissible. . . . [I]f a wager to a large amount had been made

Id. at 511 (Bosanquet, J.).
121. Id. at 500.
122. Id. Sir Pollock argued, ―The test of sincerity . . . is that respectable parties openly do that
which would disgrace them if they acted against their belief.‖ Id. at 506.
123. Id. at 500.
124. Id. at 516 (Parke, B.).
125. Id.
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as to the matter . . . , the payment of that wager, however
large the sum, would not be admissible to prove the truth of
the matter. . . . You would not have had any right to present
it to the jury as raising an inference of the truth of the fact, on
the ground that otherwise the bet would not have been paid.
It is . . . nothing but the mere statement of that fact, with
strong evidence of the belief of it by the party making it.126
One may fault the opinion for begging the question (maybe paying a bet
should be excluded too?), but one cannot deny that Baron Parke conceived the
existing general rule to exclude the proof. Without authority for doing so, the
court was hardly going to create an exception127 or suggest that nonassertive
conduct was implicitly excluded from the conception of hearsay evidence all
along, considering that it believed itself asked to ―establish an entirely new
precedent in a Court of Common Law.‖128
Similarly, all agreed that the cases in the Ecclesiastical and Prerogative
Courts, where judges sat as fact-finders and often employed different
evidence rules, were not precedent for common law courts sitting with a jury.
The rules of evidence in the Ecclesiastical Courts were different because the
judges were fact-finders ―and [could] exercise a discretion, in admitting or
rejecting evidence, which would be dangerous where the fact is tried by a
jury.‖129 In cases where similar letters had been admitted in those courts, they
―would have been clearly inadmissible in a Court of Common Law.‖130 At the
end of day, the only cases that could support a precedent were those of the
common law courts, and the fact that none were cited in the tortuous history
of the case was not lost on the House of Lords when it affirmed the letters‘
exclusion:
[I]t is a circumstance of no small weight in determining my
opinion . . . , that, with all the industry and ability of the
learned Counsel for the defendants below, no single instance
has been adduced of evidence of this kind having been
admitted in a Court of Common Law. When I reflect upon
the frequent occurrence of questions of this kind, and I must
add, the probable existence of such proof in favour of

126. Id.
127. See id. at 506. Judge Coltman speaks of the general rule requiring proof by the
examination of witnesses upon oath subject to cross examination, which places a duty on a party
seeking to do otherwise to ―shew some recognised exception to the general rule.‖ Id.
128. Id. at 514 (Bosanquet, J.).
129. Id. at 501 (Sir Cresswell, arguing for Tatham); id. at 512 (Bosanquet, J.); id. at 521
(Tindall, J.).
130. Id. at 502 (Sir Cresswell, arguing for Tatham); id. at 512 (Bosanquet, J.); id. at 521
(Tindall, J.).
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competency, I cannot account for its absence, except upon the
supposition that it has been assumed and considered to be
inadmissible for the purpose for which the evidence was upon
the present occasion tendered.131
The Wright judges took pains to avoid making new law or disguising new
law as part of the old. That attitude makes the case an especially good
indicator of the state of the preexisting law, however poor an exemplar it is of
dynamic common law evolution. The preexisting law, against which the
Founders would have framed the Confrontation Clause, included nonassertive
conduct within its conception of hearsay evidence. Such evidence was
inadmissible without specific exception, of which none applied, leaving
counsel to urge (unsuccessfully) a previously unrecognized reduction in the
hearsay rule‘s scope.132
Consequently, suggestions that the Wright case made a mess of an earlier
hearsay conception consistent with the assertion-based view are either
anachronisms or perhaps wishful thinking among those who prefer the
assertion-based view. For example, the court in Stoddard v. State133 suggested
an ―earlier, and essentially indistinguishable, common law counterpart[]‖ to
the Federal Rules‘ assertion-centered definition of hearsay that created a
―well-marked boundary between . . . clean-cut paradigms of hearsay and nonhearsay,‖ but which lasted only until the Wright court disrupted the heretofore
―ship shape‖ hearsay rule with its ―caveat‖ of implied assertions.134 But the
court failed to offer even the slightest historical evidence for the existence of
such halcyon days before Wright. Instead, it relied on Professor Mueller‘s
observation that to use the term ―implied assertion‖ to refer to what a
declarant‘s conduct suggests, rather than what it is intended to convey,
―divorces ‗assertion‘ from normal usage, making it mean essentially
‗evidence‘ and severing it from expressive or communicative purpose.‖135

131. Wright v. Tatham, (1838) 7 Eng. Rep. 559, 570 (H.L.) (Williams, J.).
132. Maguire, supra note 114, at 752–53.
As a general exclusive principle, the hearsay rule was solidly established. The
foundations of the main exceptions admitting some assertive hearsay had also
been laid. Those exceptions certainly did not include anything covering the
needs of the litigant offering the letters in the immediate situation, nor does
there appear in the long and varied discussion much special urging to fabricate a
new hearsay exception. Argument of counsel and judges can on the whole be
most easily referred to as effort for and against restricting definition of the
exclusionary rule‘s scope.
Id. (discussing the Wright case).
133. 850 A.2d 406 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), rev‟d, 887 A.2d 564 (Md. 2005).
134. Id. at 412.
135. Mueller, supra note 32, at 419 n.153.
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Although true, Professor Mueller‘s observation hardly provides support
for the proposition that the hearsay definition existing at the Founding used
the term ―assertion‖ in the way in which we may use it today, nor is there any
evidence that he intended his observation as a historical argument. Professor
Mueller was simply making a point about what he—like other assertioncentered proponents—sees as the overbreadth of Wright‘s conception of
hearsay and the unfortunate locution declarant-centered proponents use when
trying to show their position consistent with the language of Federal Rule
801(c).136 Baron Parke‘s Wright opinion refers to implied statements, not
implied assertions, making no pretense that its holding was consistent with an
assertion-centered view.137
Moreover, recent studies of evidence law existing at the Founding agree
that the prevailing definitions of hearsay did not even include the phrase
―truth of the matter,‖ much less the phrase ―truth of the matter asserted.‖138
They referred more generally to all unsworn, out-of-court statements.139 To
this definition, the contemporary, commonly used evidence sources added the
lack of cross-examination as a rationale.140 It is that rationale which the
Supreme Court holds limits the Confrontation Clause to out-of-court
statements by persons whose cross-examination is useful because their
credibility is implicated, i.e., when their statements are offered for the truth of
the matter asserted.141 If hearsay‘s contemporaneous formal Founding
definition did not even limit hearsay statements to those offered for the ―truth
of the matter,‖ then it surely does not follow that it further limited hearsay

136. Id.
137. Wright v. Tatham, (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 516–17 (Exch. Div.) (Parke, B.).
[P]roof of a particular fact . . . which is relevant only as implying a statement or
opinion of a third person . . . [is] inadmissible in all cases where such a
statement or opinion not on oath would be of itself inadmissible; and, therefore,
. . . the letters which are offered only to prove the competence of the testator,
that is the truth of the implied statements therein contained, were properly
rejected.
Id.
138. Stephen Aslett, Comment, Crawford‟s Curious Dictum: Why Testimonial „Non-Hearsay‟
Implicates the Confrontation Clause, 82 TUL. L. REV. 297, 311–22 (2008); Thomas Y. Davies, Not
“The Framers‟ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the
Crawford–Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15
J.L. & POL‘Y 349, 351 n.9, 462 n.279 (2007).
139. Davies, supra note 138; Aslett, supra note 138, at 312 (citing Thomas Y. Davies,
Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in Crawford‟s “Cross-Examination Rule: A Reply to Mr. Kry, 72
BROOK. L. REV. 557, 561–62 n.15 (2007); Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and
When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105,
196 (2005)).
140. Aslett, supra note 138, at 313 n.83.
141. Id. at 311–22.
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only to the truth of matters that a declarant had intentionally asserted.
Finally, there was nothing about the term ―statement‖ in that hearsay
definition that showed a choice to avoid using it as the Wright court did,
namely to include actions that effectively ―make a statement‖ about an actor‘s
beliefs, even if the actor did not intend to communicate them.
In fact, one commentator has gone so far as to suggest that a historically
accurate definition of hearsay requires post-Crawford courts to demand
confrontation of all testimonial statements made out of court, even if they are
not hearsay under any modern definition because they are not offered for their
truth.142 That approach would include nonassertive hearsay whose inclusion
this Article urges. But it would also go further and encompass statements that
do not implicate a declarant‘s credibility, such as a murder victim‘s report to
police that the defendant was dealing drugs, when offered only to show that
the defendant knew that the victim was accusing him, and thus had motive for
murder, rather than to show that the defendant had been dealing drugs.143
Nothing in this Article‘s analysis supports that result, which demands
confrontation even when the missed opportunity to cross-examine has no
bearing on the statement‘s probative value because its relevance depends only

142. Id.
143. Id. at 303. Aslett argues that the defendant in such a case is prejudiced because he must
disprove the allegation (and hence the strength of the motive) by evidence besides the victim‘s crossexamination, and that ―the jury could still be convinced that the false accusation itself was enough‖
to provide a motive to kill ―if the false accusation caused negative consequences.‖ Id. at 302–03.
The argument proves too much. It is precisely because even a false accusation can give motive for
murder that hearsay theory calls the victim‘s credibility not probative when the allegation is offered
merely for the fact that it was known to the defendant, and not to show the defendant‘s involvement
in drug dealing. There is no drug dealing established by the statement to disprove by crossexamination or otherwise. If the prosecution does introduce the evidence to show the defendant‘s
drug dealing, and hence a more specific and powerful reason to fear the accusation and to kill to
eliminate it, then confrontation is required because the evidence is being offered for the truth. If the
prosecution does not offer the evidence for the truth, then it is limited to arguing whatever motive
can be inferred from the victim‘s accusation, whether a ridiculous lie or the gospel truth, and the
defendant is limited to showing that the allegation—true or false—was unknown to him or unlikely
to cause him harm. Aslett betrays his allegiance to the ―truth of the matter asserted‖ conception by
choosing an example of testimonial non-hearsay that he can claim implicates the declarants‘
credibility only because juries will use it wrongly. His other example is that of testimonial
statements on whose truth experts rely when rendering their opinions, but which juries are told to use
only for the non-hearsay purpose of evaluating the basis for the expert‘s opinion, and not directly for
the truth of their contents. One need not reject the ―truth of the matter‖ formulation to find that the
testimony of an expert whose opinion presupposes the truth of the testimonial statements is enough to
trigger the confrontation right. See, e.g., People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732–33 (N.Y. 2005)
(experts‘ reliance on testimonial hearsay statements for their truth triggers defendant‘s confrontation
right because evaluating the expert‘s opinion requires ―accepting as a premise . . . that the statements
were true,‖ so ―[t]he distinction between a statement offered for its truth and a statement offered to
shed light on an expert‘s opinion is not meaningful in this context‖).
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upon whether it was spoken.144 Surely more than a general definition that
historically did not expressly state the ―truth of the matter‖ limitation, but
which did incorporate the absence of cross-examination rationale, is required
before reaching that result. None of the articles showing the absence of the
―truth of matter asserted‖ language in the hearsay definition cite cases in
which courts included out-of-court statements not offered for their truth
within the ambit of hearsay, and consequently excluded the statements or
demanded the declarants‘ confrontation. In contrast, Wright‘s holding is an
express statement of the common law‘s inclusion of nonassertive conduct
within the ambit of hearsay and constitutes a landmark precedent for
consequently excluding it at trial. Thus, all the historical indications support
extending the confrontation right at least far enough to encompass the
testimonial, nonassertive conduct whose exclusion we can be certain the
common law courts required.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR INCORPORATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFINITION OF
HEARSAY
Constitutionally mandating the declarant-centered definition of hearsay
for confrontation purposes need not be disruptive. Rather than provide two
different definitions of hearsay, one for testimonial hearsay offered against
criminal defendants and another for all other situations, courts and legislatures
in all jurisdictions can simply revert to the original common law definition
encompassing nonassertive conduct. Each jurisdiction can then choose
whether to enact a hearsay exception for nonassertive conduct, which would
not allow admission of testimonial, nonassertive conduct without
confrontation. This proposal would simply require courts to do with
nonassertive conduct what they are already doing with all other hearsay—that
is, base the confrontation right on whether the hearsay is testimonial, without
regard for whether an applicable hearsay exception applies. Recasting

144. For example, eliminating the truth of the matter asserted requirement would demand
confrontation even if the victim‘s accusation were offered merely to prove that he was able to speak
and thus alive when he reported the defendant‘s drug activities to the police. Aslett seems to avoid
this result by limiting his example to one where he assumes that a jury would use the evidence for its
forbidden hearsay inference, although it is also relevant for a non-hearsay purpose. The real test of
Aslett‘s thesis is whether the Confrontation Clause is offended when the lack of confrontation
potentially impedes the defendant‘s ability to rebut evidence that is correctly used for its non-hearsay
purpose. For example, does the Confrontation Clause prohibit using the unsworn, uncross-examined
accusation to prove that the accuser was alive before the defendant allegedly killed him because he is
not available to the defense to contradict the proof? Does it prohibit using the victim‘s accusations
against the defendant, regardless of their truth, to show the defendant‘s motive to kill because the
victim is not available to the defendant to deny that he ever made the threats? Although it is
undoubtedly true that the definition of hearsay was less than fully developed at the Founding, it
seems unlikely that the oath and cross-examination rationales were so far divorced from the concern
for witness credibility.
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nonassertive conduct as a hearsay exception would prevent courts from
confusing its exclusion by post-Founding hearsay definitions with its
constitutionally required inclusion under the Confrontation Clause. A
uniform definition of hearsay would remind courts to protect defendants‘ right
to confront testimonial, nonassertive conduct and the testimonial, intended
assertions defined as hearsay by the Federal Rules.
In contrast, accomplishing that goal will be elusive in a regime in which
the declarant-centered definition of hearsay applies to testimonial statements
offered against criminal defendants, while the assertion-centered definition,
which excludes nonassertive conduct, applies in all other circumstances.
First, the belief that the hearsay definition reflects a single, correct conceptual
structure rather than a historically contingent one reflecting different policy
choices equivalent to those informing hearsay exceptions will undoubtedly
persist. As shown by the cases in Part II, there is a persistent, though
incorrect, association between non-hearsay under Federal Rule 801(c) and
statements that are not offered for the truth of any matter and thus do not
implicate the declarant‘s credibility.145 That association has outlasted the
Federal Rules by more than thirty years and will continue to encourage courts
to think that the assertion-centered definition with which they are familiar
applies across the board.146
More critically, nonassertive conduct can easily be overlooked as hearsay,
a fact that plays no small role in some commentators‘ arguments for excluding
it from the statutory definition.147 But where there is no option to exclude it
because the Confrontation Clause demands the declarant-centered definition,
realizing the constitutional goal requires a doctrine that will help lawyers and
judges recognize nonassertive hearsay. Doing so requires practice, and the
easiest way to encourage courts and lawyers to practice is by changing the
statutory definition of hearsay to track the constitutional definition.
Jurisdictions that currently exclude nonassertive conduct from hearsay can
then create a hearsay exception for nonassertive conduct, while those that
retained the traditional declarant-centered view need not.148 Instead of
employing the constitutional definition in only the relatively few cases where
prosecutors offer testimonial, nonassertive conduct, courts and lawyers will
use it all the time, while also becoming familiar with a hearsay exception that,

145. See supra notes 38–45 and accompanying text.
146. One might say that the incorrect assumption of a single definition sparked the need for this
Article.
147. Park, supra note 14, at 791.
148. Compare FED. R. EVID. 801(c), which would require an exception, with TEX. R. EVID.
801(c), which would not.
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in most jurisdictions, will allow the proof except when the Confrontation
Clause applies.
The proposal uses the bias in favor of a single definition to capture all the
hearsay whose identification the Constitution demands. It requires lawyers
and courts routinely to exercise the ―muscles‖ necessary to identify all
hearsay requiring confrontation. It also requires them to learn the exception
for nonassertive conduct, pursuant to which such conduct will be admissible
in cases where the Confrontation Clause does not apply. Encountering a case
when the prosecution offers potentially testimonial, nonassertive conduct,
courts and defense lawyers will recognize it as hearsay and realize—as they
do now for assertion-centered hearsay—that the statement‘s testimonial
quality, not its qualification under a hearsay exception, determines
admissibility without confrontation. Courts and lawyers will be far less likely
to spot testimonial, nonassertive hearsay under a regime that defines it as
hearsay pursuant to a rarely used rule that applies only when the prosecution
offers such evidence against criminal defendants.
Moreover, there is an important collateral benefit to changing the hearsay
definition even in those cases where confrontation is not an issue. In most
jurisdictions, nonassertive conduct will be admissible pursuant to a hearsay
exception rather than excluded by the basic hearsay definition. Admitting
nonassertive conduct under a hearsay exception recognizes that the person
engaging in that conduct is a hearsay declarant whose credibility can be
attacked and supported as if he were a witness.149
Admission of persons‘ nonassertive conduct makes their credibility
relevant, like that of any hearsay declarant under the assertion-centered
definition, so there can be no argument against this result. That the Federal
Rules allow impeachment of statements admitted under hearsay exceptions
justified by reduced hearsay dangers, but deny impeachment of nonassertive
conduct admitted pursuant to a narrowed hearsay definition that is also
justified by reduced hearsay dangers, has always been an anomaly leading to
arbitrary and indefensible results.150 For example, in United States v. GarciaVillanueva, the court held that a criminal defendant, whose out-of-court
statements telling her alleged accomplices not to smuggle aliens had been
admitted to show her noninvolvement, should have been declared immune
from impeachment.151 The court reasoned that the defendant could not be

149. FED. R. EVID. 806.
150. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 972–73
(1974). Professor Tribe argues that reduced, but not eliminated, hearsay dangers associated with
nonassertive conduct justifies, at most, creating a hearsay exception that admits nonassertive conduct
while allowing its impeachment pursuant to Federal Rule 806.
151. 855 F.2d 863, No. 87-5261, 1988 WL 86215, at *1–3 (9th Cir. 1988).
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impeached because her statements were ―verbal conduct‖ providing
circumstantial evidence of state of mind, which is not hearsay under Federal
Rule 801, rather than hearsay statements asserting her state of mind, which is
hearsay under Federal Rule 801, but admissible pursuant to Federal Rule
803(3)‘s state of mind exception. Either way, however, her credibility was
implicated; the probative value of the proof as evidence of her desire that she
not be involved depended entirely upon whether she meant for her
accomplices to refrain from smuggling (sincerity) and the accuracy with
which her words reported her attitude about her own, rather than the others‘,
involvement (narration or ambiguity).
The proposal avoids the possibility that courts would disallow
impeachment of nonassertive conduct altogether because it does not qualify as
hearsay. That result unjustifiably exempts nonassertive conduct from
impeachment, although its probative value depends on the declarant‘s
credibility. Worse, such a result would compound the injury to defendants
who are denied the opportunity to impeach the persons whose nonassertive
conduct they also are not able to confront. (Thus, for example, none of the
defendants in the cases discussed in Part II would have been allowed to
impeach the absent declarants as if they were witnesses.) Consequently, the
defendants cannot introduce the declarants‘ inconsistent statements unless
another hearsay exception applies.152 Nor can they show that the declarants
were convicted of perjury, are biased against the defendant, or suffer from
memory loss.153 Such a result is indefensible and, with respect to the bias
evidence, may even be unconstitutional.154 Changing the statutory definition
to include nonassertive conduct while creating a hearsay exception for such
conduct will assure that courts will allow impeachment of those declarants.
This result benefits fact-finding in all cases and avoids the ―double whammy‖
under current law when defendants can neither confront nor impeach
testimonial, nonassertive conduct.
V. PROTECTING THE CONFRONTATION RIGHT FROM EVISCERATION BY
EVIDENCE JUSTIFYING INVESTIGATORS‘ BEHAVIOR
Extending the confrontation right to testimonial, nonassertive conduct will
have little or no effect unless courts protect it from routine evasion by
prosecutors claiming to introduce testimonial hearsay only for its effect on the
listener and not for the truth of the matter asserted to explain investigators‘
actions that defendants have not questioned. By arguing that investigators

152. FED. R. EVID. 613.
153. See FED. R. EVID. 609; see also United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984).
154. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (the Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses includes the right to show a witness‘s bias against a defendant).
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took the steps they did because they observed or otherwise learned of the
testimonial hearsay, prosecutors have been able to introduce such evidence
with alarming frequency, leaving a misleading limiting instruction the
defendant‘s only possible protection.155 Without a clear constitutional
mandate to avoid this result, courts are rendering the Confrontation Clause‘s
protection against unconfronted, testimonial hearsay illusory. Although this
problem encompasses all testimonial hearsay, it is particularly acute for
nonassertive conduct. An instruction that tells the jury not to use nonassertive
conduct for the truth of the matter asserted is particularly misleading, if not
incoherent, because nonassertive conduct is not offered to prove anything that
155. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 560 F.3d 754, 764–65 (8th Cir. 2009) (evidence that the
victim said he knew the person who shot him and his accomplice as ―Clean‖ and ―Charmar‖ was
admitted to show why the officer searched a database for those names and found an incident report
linking the defendants and providing their full names); United States v. Pugh, 273 F. App‘x 449, 455
(6th Cir. 2008) (testimony that the officer was given the defendant‘s name as a suspect was
admissible to show why he investigated him); Decay v. State, No. CR 08-1259, 2009 WL 3785695
(Ark. Nov. 12, 2009) (court admitted the detective‘s testimony that ―an individual that told us that
Mr. Decay told him that he committed the murders‖ to explain ―why Decay was not arrested on April
4, 2007, but was arrested on April 6, 2007‖) (internal quotation marks omitted); People v. Varnado,
Nos. B188489, B194298, B195683, 2007 WL 3025083 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2007) (inculpatory
eyewitness identifications were admissible to explain why the officer included the defendants‘
pictures in a photo array); State v. Barney, 185 P.3d 277, 279 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (evidence of an
anonymous call to police describing a person going to doors and peeking in windows in a certain
neighborhood was admitted ―to explain the officers‘ actions after receiving the dispatch‖ and ―how
the officer initially approached Barney as a suspect‖); Commonwealth v. Pelletier, 879 N.E.2d 125,
130 (Mass. Ct. App. 2008) (the victims‘ statements to police were offered to provide context for the
police investigation); People v. Hall, 861 N.Y.S.2d 889, 890–91 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (testimony
that a police officer told the defendant that his mother had not corroborated his alibi was admitted ―to
explain why the defendant confessed to the police when he did,‖ although the court did not say why
the timing of the defendant‘s confession was relevant and declined to decide whether the prosecutor
used the testimony improperly because the contention was ―not preserved for our review‖) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); State v. James, 158 P.3d 102, 109–10 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)
(evidence of statements by anonymous informants was admitted to ―recount[] the course of the
investigation to explain why the investigation was in the . . . neighborhood‖ and to ―connect to‖
testifying witnesses‘ claims that they also heard multiple shots); cf. State v. Simmons, 233 S.W.3d
235, 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (police officer‘s testimony about the victim‘s description of the details
of her sexual abuse, ―including where episodes occurred, what sex acts transpired and how Daughter
and Defendant cleaned up, afterwards,‖ was admissible to show motivation behind the investigation
and to explain the ―Daughter‘s examination at the emergency room and the seizure and testing of
washcloths found in Defendant‘s home‖; court discussed hearsay but not the confrontation issue
because an accomplice testified at trial); People v. Carney, 795 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005) (court admitted testimony concerning a 911 call made by a non-testifying declarant ―as
background information explaining why the police took a series of investigatory actions‖); United
States v. Burchard, No. 5:07-Cr-9, 2007 WL 1894257 (W.D. Ky. Jun. 29, 2007) (prosecution may
offer officers‘ testimony about declarants‘ allegations that the defendant used and sold drugs to
explain why the defendant was investigated and searched for committing those crimes);
Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1017 (Pa. 2007) (trooper‘s testimony that defendant‘s
accomplice gave an alibi that conflicted with the defendant‘s was admissible ―to explain the
justification for further investigating [them]‖; court discussed hearsay but not the confrontation issue
because an accomplice testified at trial).
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the declarant explicitly or implicitly intends to assert. Thus, clarifying the
hearsay inferences arising from nonassertive conduct creates a propitious
opportunity also to consider the very limited circumstances under which true
non-hearsay use of testimonial statements avoids implicating the
Confrontation Clause.
As an example, consider the following scenario.156 The courts in all of the
cases discussed in Part II see the light and hold that testimonial, nonassertive
conduct triggers the confrontation right. Without producing the declarants,
the prosecution nonetheless calls the officers who heard the declarants‘
inculpatory statements to testify about those statements, which admittedly
require confrontation if offered for their truth. But when the defendants
object, the prosecutors claim that they are offering the statements only to
explain why the officers, having heard the inculpatory statements, decided to
take (or forego) some subsequent investigative step, and not for the truth of
any matters asserted by the declarants.157 The court admits the evidence as
background evidence to show the course of the investigation, although the
defendants have not made an issue of why the officers acted as they did. The
court then instructs the jury to consider inferences from the fact that the
declarants uttered the statements to investigators, but not to consider
inferences that rely on the truth of matters asserted by the declarants.
Unbeknownst to the jury, it is trapped in a dilemma that is not of its own
making: It can ignore the statements entirely, because there is no issue to
which they are relevant for their permissible, non-hearsay purpose, or it can

156. The scenario is adapted from Pelletier, 879 N.E.2d at 130, where the court, although
entertaining serious doubts about whether Crawford exempts testimonial, nonassertive conduct,
nonetheless found that such conduct did not require confrontation when offered ―to set [] the context
for the police investigation.‖ See also People v. Salido, No. B186643, 2007 WL 2325810, at *6 (Cal.
Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2007) (accomplice‘s false alibi for the defendant that linked the defendant to the
accomplice was admissible when offered to explain why officers contacted defendant).
157. The usual limiting instruction is inapt when applied to nonassertive conduct since the
declarant‘s beliefs for which it is offered are unintentionally revealed rather than intentionally
asserted. For example, the instruction does not convey that the jury is prohibited from using a
declarant‘s statement falsely exculpating the defendant as evidence that the declarant has knowledge
of the defendant‘s guilt. See supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text. Courts have even
erroneously held a limiting instruction unnecessary when a declarant‘s false exculpatory statement is
offered to show the declarant‘s knowledge of the defendant‘s guilt. United States v. Trala, 86 F.3d
536, 544–45 (3d. Cir. 2004) (cautioning the jury against considering the truthfulness of the
declarant‘s statements was unnecessary since they were obviously false and admitted to establish that
the declarant was lying to the police about the source of the money in the defendant‘s car).
Similarly, the instruction does not convey that the jury is prohibited from using the declarant‘s act of
looking for the defendant at a place where drugs are sold as proof that the defendant frequents that
location. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. A coherent instruction would say that the
jury is prohibited from using the declarant‘s statements as proof of anything that the declarant
believes. The proper instruction makes clear that the evidence has no permissible purpose
whatsoever unless the defendant has questioned the propriety of the investigation.
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consider them for their impermissible hearsay purpose in violation of the
defendants‘ confrontation rights. Misled by the court‘s limiting instruction
into believing that there is a permissible use for the evidence, the jury uses it
improperly.
The scenario described above is entirely avoidable if courts recognize that,
unless the defense raises one, no issue exists as to why the police may have
acted as they did or why the investigation developed as it did to which the
testimonial hearsay is relevant if used for its non-hearsay inference. Judge
Easterbrook crystallized the essential problem with the reasoning of courts
who consider such testimony relevant despite the defense by noting that
―every time a person says to the police ‗X committed the crime‘ the statement
(including all corroborating details) would be admissible to show why the
police investigated X.‖158 Sanctioning that rubric ―would eviscerate the
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine one‘s accusers.‖159 Out-ofcourt statements admitted for their effect on the police to explain why they
acted as they did are relevant only when the defendant argues that, for
example, the officers were ―officious intermeddlers staking out [the
defendant] for nefarious purposes.‖160 When such an argument is not made,
however, that type of testimony is not relevant.161 Meanwhile, other courts
have also recognized that ―[a]llowing agents to narrate the course of their
investigations, and thus spread before juries damning information that is not
subject to cross-examination, would go far toward abrogating the defendant‘s
rights under the Sixth Amendment and the hearsay rule.‖162
Nonetheless, many courts continue to hold that there is no error in
routinely admitting such evidence as long as juries are told not to consider the
evidence for its truth. For example, in Davis v. State,163 the Texas Court of
Appeals held that permitting a detective to testify to the substance of
anonymous tips inculpating the defendant was not error.164 The court found
that the statements had not been admitted for their truth, but rather to put the
investigation into ―context.‖165 The court expressly rejected the defendant‘s
proposal that the court ―limit testimony for this purpose to situations where
the defendant challenges the investigation as being motivated by vendetta or
158. United States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1020; see also United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004); Sanabria v.
State, 974 A.2d 107, 118–19 (Del. 2009); State v. Johnson, No. 34539-1-II, 2007 WL 1417312, at *4
(Wash. App. Div. May 15, 2007).
163. 169 S.W.3d 673 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005).
164. Id. at 676.
165. Id.
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grudge.‖166 Tellingly, the court provided no explanation as to how this
context testimony is otherwise relevant. Instead, it simply denied that there
could be error because statements not offered for their truth are not hearsay.
Instructions about limited admissibility cannot be expected to prevent
evidence‘s impermissible use when, contrary to the court‘s instruction, the
proof has no permissible use at all. Indeed, many courts‘ persistent admission
of context evidence to explain the course of the investigation by police,
despite the defendant doing nothing to dispute the conduct of the
investigation, makes the point. How can we expect the jury to disregard the
proof entirely when courts themselves fail to appreciate its irrelevance in that
circumstance?
The persistent, though erroneous, assumption of relevancy seemingly rests
on two possibilities. First, one can see the evidence as relevant because a
criminal prosecution reflects a judgment by police or prosecutors that the
defendant is guilty. Consequently, every investigative step taken or foregone,
despite whether it results in admissible evidence, is relevant to evaluating
whether the prosecution‘s conclusion is justified. Second, the evidence‘s
relevance can be defended as a preemptive strike against a misleading
inference that might flow from the prohibition on the prosecution, in the first
instance, from ―provid[ing] some explanation for [investigators‘] presence
and conduct.‖167 Presumably, the feared inference is that mentioned by Judge
Easterbrook—the police were acting without justification—a conclusion that
the jury may draw if prosecutors cannot prove why the police behaved as they
did.
The first conception is so obviously improper that one will not find courts
explicitly defending it. The law is clear that juries are to find facts by
evaluating for themselves the strength of the evidence that is admitted at trial
and are not to abdicate their responsibility by evaluating the reasonableness of
the conclusion of guilt implicit in the prosecution‘s bringing the case to trial.
Whatever the limits of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals168 may
prove to be, only a sea change in Anglo-American evidence law would permit
166. Id.
167. See United States v. Levine, 378 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (E.D. Ark. 2005).
168. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), its progeny, and the
amended Federal Rule 702 that it spawned, govern the admissibility of expert testimony. In United
States v. Johnson, the court held that when experts provide opinion testimony that relies on hearsay,
the prosecution should be prevented from eliciting the contents of the statements, even though they
may bear on the reasonableness of the expert‘s conclusion. 587 F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 2009). It
noted how important it is ―that district courts recognize the risk that a particular expert might become
nothing more than a transmitter of testimonial hearsay and exercise their discretion in a manner to
avoid such abuses.‖ Id. The Johnson court‘s attitude toward evidence admissible only to show the
basis of an expert‘s opinion bears contrast with the courts‘ attitude toward evidence admissible only
to show background discussed in this Article. In Johnson, the court protected the defendant‘s
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investigators to give expert testimony containing their opinion of the
defendant‘s guilt; such an approach would render the entire investigation
admissible to allow the jury to evaluate the basis for the investigators‘
conclusions. Moreover, we ask jurors in criminal cases to evaluate the
strength of evidence admitted at trial, and not to decide whether the
prosecution acted with sufficient justification.169 The latter question is one for
the court to decide under the rules of criminal procedure. Standard jury
instructions telling jurors not to consider law enforcement techniques are
intended to dissuade them from deciding whether they think that the
prosecution, given its conduct, deserves a conviction, rather than whether the
proof, however produced, eliminates a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime.170 To put the point more prosaically, our fundamental
conception of evidence relevant at trial still rests on a firm distinction between
the first and second half of an episode of the original Law and Order
television series. Each episode is divided into the story of the police
confrontation right from exposure to testimonial hearsay statements despite their relevance as a
foundation for the expert‘s opinion and the possibility of a limiting instruction. In many cases
discussed in this Article, the courts routinely exposed the defendants‘ confrontation right to
testimonial hearsay statements, despite their inadmissibility as proof of the crimes charged, by
claiming that a limiting instruction was sufficient.
169. There are rare exceptions. Watson v. State provides a good example. 8 So. 3d 901 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2008). In Watson, the defendant was charged with feloniously fleeing a law enforcement
officer in a motor vehicle pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-9-72(2) (2006). One of the
elements of that crime requires the pursuing officer to have ―reasonable suspicion to believe the
driver in question has committed a crime.‖ MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-72-(1); see also Watson, 8
So. 3d at 904. Thus, it was necessary that the Watson court admit an out-of-court statement made to
the officer accusing the defendant of shoplifting to explain his reason for giving pursuit. The court
instructed the jury to use the statement to explain the officer‘s conduct, but not to use it for the truth
of the matter asserted. Watson, 8 So. 3d at 903. The rare exception for when a specific statute makes
the basis for investigators‘ actions an element of the crime proves the rule that an out-of-court
statement providing such a basis is not otherwise relevant.
170. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a); United States v. Torres-Castro, 374 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1008
(2005); see also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 387 (1964) (admissibility of evidence is a question
only for the judge, while the credibility or weight of evidence is for the jury; since the voluntariness
of a confession bears on both, unlike the issues of probable cause, consent to search, and the issuance
of Miranda warnings, the voluntariness of a confession can be litigated before the jury after the judge
finds it voluntary); United States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that a
―defendant alleging a Miranda violation is entitled to a determination outside the presence of the
jury‖); United States v. Collins, 439 F.2d 610, 614 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (―[W]hether a particular set
of facts gives rise to a probable cause basis for the belief that a suspect has performed criminal acts is
a question of law to be determined by the court outside the presence of the jury.‖); Simmons v.
United States, 206 F.2d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (noting that the ―issue of probable cause for
appellant‘s arrest [is] a matter solely for determination by the court‖). Jury instructions range from a
general ―law enforcement techniques are not your concern‖ to instructions that specific techniques
such as searches and wiretaps are lawful if the defendant‘s rights were not violated, that there is no
alleged violation before the jury, and that the jury‘s views about the use of such techniques are not to
enter into its deliberations. 4 LEONARD SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—
CRIMINAL §§ 4.01, 5.08 (2005) (Instructions 4-4 and 5-23).
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investigation (which considers whether the officers‘ suspicions about various
suspects‘ guilt is justified, and whether their investigation is proper) and the
story of the trial (which depicts the lawyers‘ presentation of the admissible
evidence). We ask the jury to judge the evidence, not the investigation. If the
police bungled their way into proof sufficient to show guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, the jury should convict no less than if a flawless
investigation uncovered the same evidence. Conversely, if the evidence falls
short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury should acquit regardless of
whether the case was assembled, and implicitly endorsed, by Sherlock
Holmes or Inspector Clousseau.
The second assumption, and one that many courts have explicitly
defended, is that it is necessary to deviate from the investigation/trial
distinction at the outset whenever exclusion of otherwise irrelevant evidence
about the investigation would create a misleading impression that the police
acted without justification. This position hypothesizes that despite general
instructions to focus exclusively on proof of the elements of the crime, juries
will nonetheless concentrate on whether investigative steps were justified,
even if defendants do not raise that issue. Consequently, anything that rebuts
a potential attack on the investigation‘s integrity is relevant, regardless of
whether the defendant chooses to launch that attack. But the argument proves
far too much.
First, by admitting evidence relevant only to the investigation‘s integrity,
courts undermine their attempt to focus the jury‘s attention on the quality of
the proof. When courts admit proof relevant only to the investigation‘s
appropriateness, they turn the prediction that juries will consider the
justification for investigative steps rather than the quality of the proof, despite
instruction to the contrary, into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Also, by admitting
the evidence before the defendant raises an issue about the investigation‘s
propriety, courts encourage defendants concerned about the evidence‘s
accrediting effect to contest the investigators‘ conduct, even if they had not
otherwise planned to do so, directing the jury‘s attention that much further
afield. Most importantly, the courts eliminate any opportunity for the defense
to prevent the jury from hearing evidence, which, if used at all, violates the
defendant‘s confrontation right.171 Ironically, courts justify this result by
hypothesizing that juries will not properly focus their attention on the trial
171. If used directly for the truth of the facts it asserts or indirectly for the truth to show a firm
foundation for the prosecution‘s belief in the defendant‘s guilt, the evidence violates the defendant‘s
confrontation rights. Cf. People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732–33 (N.Y. 2005) (experts‘ reliance
on testimonial hearsay statements for their truth triggered the defendant‘s confrontation right because
evaluating the expert‘s opinion required ―accepting as a premise . . . that the statements were true,‖
so ―[t]he distinction between a statement offered for its truth and a statement offered to shed light on
an expert‘s opinion is not meaningful in this context‖).
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despite instructions to do so, while inconsistently considering a ―not for the
truth‖ instruction sufficient to cure the Confrontation Clause problem of the
courts‘ own making. In effect, courts taking this approach allow the
prosecution to ―fight fire with fire‖ before the defendant has struck a match.
In so doing, the jury is needlessly exposed to evidence whose use is
constitutional error when there is no issue about the investigators‘ conduct.
There is no justification for this result.
Perhaps the reason why so many courts routinely allow explanatory
evidence to prevent juries from possibly inferring government misconduct,
even when doing so violates defendants‘ confrontation right, is that they have
become so accustomed to defense counsel making the argument. It is
remarkable how often the defense does raise, whether intentionally or not, a
question about the propriety of the government‘s investigation by pursuing
themes such as rush to judgment, sloppy or overreaching investigation, or
round up the usual suspect(s). Nonetheless, the frequency with which
defendants may open the door to the proof by suggesting government
misconduct does not justify admission of the evidence in anticipation. At
most, it illustrates how often defendants will choose to suggest impropriety
when a witness begins her testimony with, say, a statement that she arrived at
the scene to effect an arrest without her first testifying to the radio call that got
her there, or that she organized a lineup containing the defendant without her
first testifying to the tip that focused suspicion on him. That defendants may
often choose a route that justifies admission of the radio call or the tip for its
effect on the officer and not for the truth, however, does not justify
eliminating the defendant‘s option to prevent admission of the evidence in the
first place by not questioning the propriety of the arrest or lineup. Courts
should welcome that alternative as a first-best solution, fully protective of the
defendant‘s confrontation right and most likely to concentrate the jury‘s
attention on what should be its primary focus—the evidence stemming from
the arrest along with the identification at the lineup. Indeed, by routinely
admitting the evidence and justifying its admission by a limiting instruction,
courts have virtually invited defendants to exacerbate the jury‘s misdirection
toward the question of whether the prosecution‘s conduct, rather than the
proof, merits a conviction.
Allowing prosecutors to enter evidence explaining why the police
conducted the investigation as they did, courts unnecessarily encourage the
jury to abandon its proper role of judging the strength of the evidence in favor
of evaluating the investigation‘s merits and the investigators‘ beliefs. When
the defense makes an issue of investigators acting without sufficient basis, the
confusion of the jury‘s role is unavoidable; the prosecution must be allowed to
rebut the allegation by showing the basis upon which the investigators acted.
In this situation, the most we can expect of the court is an instruction trying to
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refocus the jury‘s attention on the evidence rather than on the investigators‘
behavior or beliefs.
There is no justification, however, for needlessly confusing those roles
when the defense does not advance such a claim. It is already a difficult
enough task to keep the jury focused on the evidence rather than on the
investigation and the beliefs of the investigators. As subsequent versions of
Law and Order show, the investigation is usually far more compelling than
the trial. Law and Order: Special Victims Unit and Law and Order: Criminal
Intent became long-running hits by spending much more time on the
investigation than on the trial, while Law and Order: Trial by Jury reversed
that emphasis and lasted only one season.172
To avoid the constitutional violation that is the inevitable consequence of
needlessly exposing the jury to evidence whose only relevance entails a
hearsay inference violating the defendant‘s confrontation right, courts should
hold that it is error to admit testimonial hearsay for its effect on investigators
unless the defendant has made an issue of their conduct.173 Few decided cases
require that the defendant raise an issue about the investigation before
admitting such evidence. In State v. Munoz, for example, the court permitted
the prosecution to prove that an anonymous caller identified the defendant as
someone to ―look at‖ in connection with a recently attempted burglary, gave
his name, age, and physical description, and while speaking with an Hispanic
accent, identified him as coming from her country. 174 Before trial, the
defendant moved to exclude the statements of the anonymous female caller,
who was not going to testify at trial, on the grounds that introducing her
172. See TV.com, Law & Order: Special Victims Unit on TV.com, http://www.tv.com/lawand-order-special-victims-unit/show/334/summary.html (last visited May 19, 2010); TV.com, Law &
Order:
Criminal
Intent
on
TV.com,
http://www.tv.com/law-and-order-criminalintent/show/1381/summary.html (last visited May 19, 2010); TV.com, Law & Order: Trial by Jury
on TV.com, http://www.tv.com/law-and-order-trial-by-jury/show/25938/summary.html (last visited
May 19, 2010).
173. United States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004), endorsed this view: ―If a jury
would not otherwise understand why an investigation targeted a particular defendant, the testimony
could dispel an accusation that the officers were officious intermeddlers staking out Silva for
nefarious purposes. No such argument was made in this case, however, and no other explanation
was given why the testimony would be relevant.‖ Id. (emphasis added). Unfortunately, however,
Silva stopped short of establishing a rule that the evidence‘s admission in that circumstance violates
the Confrontation Clause, relying instead on an ad hoc determination that ―too much‖ hearsay was
admitted, and that the trial court failed to give an appropriate limiting instruction or stop the
prosecutor from making improper use of the proof. Id. at 1020–21. While these factors may
influence whether the constitutional error was harmless, they should not affect whether admission of
the evidence was error in the first instance. See also United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 677 (6th
Cir. 2004) (inconsistently saying that evidence is helpful to the jury only on the issue of guilt where
there is no dispute about the investigation‘s subjects or reasons for their investigation, and that any
link between out-of-court statements and investigators‘ actions renders the statements relevant).
174. 949 A.2d 155, 157 (N.H. 2008).
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statements would violate his confrontation right.175 The prosecution argued
that they were admissible to show why the police obtained the defendant‘s
fingerprint card from the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS).176 The defendant‘s fingerprint matched one taken from the
balcony from which the burglar unsuccessfully attempted entry.177 The trial
court denied the defendant‘s motion, finding that since the statements were
―being offered to show the state of mind of the police,‖ rather than for their
truth, they were admissible to show why the police contacted the INS and
investigated the defendant.178 On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
found that admission of the testimony was not error because it
―demonstrate[d] the reasonableness of the police action in contacting the
INS.‖179 Thus, the Munoz court found it proper to admit the evidence even
before the defense had a chance to question the investigation and despite
whether it ever suggested that the police had acted unreasonably.180
Relying on a limiting instruction in that circumstance is unnecessary,
ineffective, and ultimately unconstitutional. When there is no permissible
non-hearsay purpose for the proof, as when there is no allegation of
impropriety to rebut, the improper use of the evidence to buttress the
prosecution‘s case is unavoidable. In the prosecutor‘s opening statement in
Munoz, for example, he ―used the tip to corroborate the description given by
[the testifying eyewitness].‖181 How is the jury, then, to understand the
evidence of the anonymous tip? The appellate court did not consider whether
that use of the tip entailed a hearsay use of the proof since the defense counsel
did not specifically object to the opening statement after losing his motion in
limine to keep out the description.182 But one can hardly blame defense
counsel.
According to the Munoz court‘s ruling, anything that might bear on the
reasonableness of the officers‘ actions—a question it specifically analogized
to a court‘s determination of probable cause183—was admissible. The
175. Id. at 159.
176. Id. at 160.
177. Id. at 157.
178. Id. at 160.
179. Id. at 161.
180. Indeed, the trial court noted that it was routine to ―put in any kind of anonymous tip that‘s
called in,‖ as long as it was ―offered to show the state of mind of police‖ bearing on the basis for
their actions. Munoz, 949 A.2d at 160 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Barney,
185 P.3d 277, 280–81 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (deeming the offending proof admissible before trial in a
hearing on a motion in limine); United States v. Burchard, No. 5:06-Cr-9, 2007 WL 1894257 (W.D.
Ky. Jun. 29, 2007) (same).
181. Id. at 161.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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matching descriptions gave the police reason to credit the tip and therefore
obtain the defendant‘s fingerprint card. How was defense counsel supposed
to divine that the court would suddenly accept that the jury would misuse the
tip as corroboration supporting the testifying eyewitness‘s identification rather
than as support for the investigators‘ suspicion that the defendant had
committed the crime? And why would the appellate court so anxiously avoid
the question of whether the prosecutor‘s comment amounted to improper use
of the tip unless it were plainly apparent that it is unreasonable to expect
jurors to distinguish information on which they can rely to decide guilt from
information on which they can rely only to evaluate the investigation, after
exposing them to the latter without reason? After all, if the prosecutor‘s
comment went too far, did that mean that the jury was not supposed to note
that the descriptions matched, or on its own realize that it was supposed to use
the corroboration only as proof of an issue that it was not asked to decide (the
reasonableness of the investigation), while ignoring the corroboration‘s
obvious value as proof of an issue it was asked to decide (the identity of the
erstwhile burglar)?
When the consequence of the evidence‘s use is a constitutional violation
because the proof is testimonial hearsay, the Confrontation Clause prohibits
its admission for its effect on investigators merely because jurors might
consider the propriety of the investigators‘ actions, even when explicitly
instructed that the investigators‘ actions are not their concern. The alternative
allows routine evasion of the Confrontation Clause, while its protections
evaporate in a nod and wink among prosecutors. Unfortunately, even those
courts that are sensitive to this possibility have not clearly stated that
admission of the proof before defendants question an investigation‘s propriety
is a constitutional violation. Instead, they have often sanctioned the lesser
alternative of ―sanitizing‖ the content of the statements, an expedient which
guarantees continued abuse of the ―not for the truth‖ path to admission of
testimonial hearsay. For example, some courts have allowed investigators to
testify only to having ―acted ‗upon information received‘ or words to that
effect,‖ reasoning that the need for evidence explaining actions of the police is
slight before the defendant challenges them, while the potential for misuse is
great.184 Nonetheless, such an approach still fails to explain how the evidence
is relevant at all, why a jury focusing on the investigation despite contrary
instruction will discount proof that the police have information besides that
admitted at trial, what amounts to proper sanitation, and whether such
sanitation can be accomplished.

184. United States v. Levine, 378 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875–76 (E.D. Ark. 2005) (citing
2 MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 249, at 103).
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Munoz, again, serves as an example. Once the trial court indicated that it
would allow the anonymous call to explain ―why the investigation took the
turn that it did,‖ the defendant suggested allowing the officer to testify merely
that the investigation had led police to suspect the defendant.185 The trial
court rejected the suggestion, stating that it would unfairly prejudice the
defendant by suggesting that the police were aware of his past criminal
activity. It then allowed the prosecution, as a less prejudicial alternative, to
prove the caller‘s suggestion that the police ―look at‖ the defendant in
connection with the specific burglary for which he was on trial.186 The trial
court was clearly correct to envision that any reference to extrajudicial
information implicating the defendant in possession of the police, even if
unspecified, would invariably be used for its truth since nobody questioned
the propriety of the investigation. But admitting specific information
implicating the defendant in the crime for which he was on trial hardly
improved matters.
The trial court seemed more concerned with the prospect that the jury
would use the proof as evidence of other crimes than it was with the prospect
that the jury would violate the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right by using
the information either as proof that the defendant had engaged in other crimes
or as proof of the crime for which the defendant was on trial. The court was
correct to think that even a general reference to extrajudicial information
obtained by the police justifying the investigation would prejudice the
defendant by inviting the jury to perceive that information as accurately
implicating the defendant in something, if not this particular crime. But the
same argument was at least as powerful for the prejudice resulting from
admission of the specific information; if the jury would ignore a limiting
instruction to find proof of other crimes, why would it not ignore a limiting
instruction to find proof of this one? How could evidence of no relevance
possibly justify a constitutional violation? Remarkably, all we are told is that
courts ―put in any kind of anonymous tip that‘s called in‖ if ―it‘s being offered
to show the state of mind of the police,‖187 and that by premising his objection
185. Munoz, 949 A.2d at 160.
186. Id.
187. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly flawed reasoning has caused courts to
decide whether testimonial hearsay statements offered to explain investigators‘ behavior violate the
Confrontation Clause by considering how prejudicial they are rather than whether they have any
relevance for a non-hearsay purpose. In State v. Barney, the court held that a limit to the
admissibility of hearsay in this context requires exclusion when the hearsay ―tend[s] to identify the
accused and establish his guilt.‖ 185 P.3d 277, 281–82 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007). The court nonetheless
allowed a description of Barney‘s physical attributes, clothing, and activities of peeping into
windows, approaching doors, and ringing doorbells, finding that ―the testimony did not identify a
particular individual who had committed a particular crime.‖ Id. at 282. The analysis confuses the
question of whether admitting this evidence before the defendant questioned the officers‘ actions
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only on the Confrontation Clause, defense counsel somehow waived any
claim that the evidence‘s nonexistent probative value was outweighed by its
prejudicial effect.188
The Munoz court avoided addressing how the probative value of the proof
justified its prejudice, but others have attempted to address the problem by
striking a proper balance. Those courts have had no success in formulating
coherent protection for the defendant‘s confrontation rights because they
erroneously concede that explanatory evidence is relevant in the absence of an
express or implied challenge to the propriety of the investigators‘ conduct.
They typically begin by exploring the possibility of excising the content of the
hearsay statement in favor of having the officer testify merely that he had
―received information‖ before taking subsequent action.189 But even that
simple expedient is problematic. One court prefers it because that court

violated the Confrontation Clause with whether the violation was harmless error. The Confrontation
Clause does not only give a defendant the right to confront testimony that a court thinks is
particularly damning any more than it guarantees only the right to confront testimony that a court
thinks is unreliable. Puzzlingly, the Barney court, after noting that it must ―first consider whether the
evidence is relevant,‖ never discussed why the officers‘ reason for investigating Barney was relevant.
Id. at 281.
188. See also United States v. Brown, 560 F.3d 754, 764–65 (8th Cir. 2009). The court there
held that a Confrontation Clause objection to evidence that the victim identified the defendants as his
assailants admitted to explain why an officer searched a database for the defendants‘ names was
insufficient to preserve a claim on appeal that the purported non-hearsay reason for admission of this
evidence was a subterfuge to get the victim‘s statement about the defendants in front of the jury. The
court held that issue was waived because counsel ―did not argue at trial that the prejudicial effect of
the evidence outweighed its non-hearsay value.‖ Id. The holding presupposes that non-hearsay use
of the evidence made a fact of consequence more likely than it would be without the evidence, i.e.,
was relevant, a position that the court assumed, but never articulated. The defendant never alleged
misconduct in the way the police got to the defendants. Since the court would or could not articulate
the evidence‘s relevance, it is a hard rule that says that defense counsel, on pain of waiving his
Confrontation Clause objection, has to play along and pretend it is relevant to argue that its probative
value is nonetheless outweighed by prejudice.
189. United States v. Cabriera-Rivera, 583 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 2009) (―[T]he government fails
to show why the details [of the accomplice‘s] confession were necessary to explain the investigative
source . . . . [T]he government could simply have had the officers testify that they discovered the
evidence based on ‗information received.‘‖); United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 23 (1st Cir. 2006)
(officer should have been required to testify that he ―acted on information received‖ rather than
report that he had been told by [the declarant] that the defendant supplied [the declarant] with drugs);
United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 677 (6th Cir. 2004) (―[Officer] O‘Brien had merely stated
that she ‗had information‘ about the Buchanan residence that led her to begin an investigation.
O‘Brien thus alluded, in the vaguest possible terms, to the statements made to her by a [criminal
informant]‖); Sanabria v. State, 974 A.2d 107, 112–17 (Del. 2009) (―The trial judge [abused its
discretion because it] never considered whether that background explanation could have been
provided by simply referencing that Officer Garcia was acting ‗on information received.‘‖); State v.
Johnson, No. 34539-1-II, 2007 WL 1417312, at *5 (Wash. App. Div. May 15, 2007) (―It might have
been sufficient to elicit that the deputies acted on a tip, or that they received information consistent
with Johnson, without setting forth the details that [the declarant] spoke with a prostitute and
received a description of a pimp matching Johnson.‖).
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believes testimony that does ―not itself quote or paraphrase the declarant‘s
statements‖ even if ―the jury would necessarily infer that the declarant had
said X‖ does not violate the Confrontation Clause.190 Other courts concede
that such testimony can violate the Clause, but believe it less likely to tempt
the jury to rely on the unconfronted hearsay.191
The first argument simply ignores established doctrine holding that
hearsay proved indirectly is no less objectionable than hearsay proved
directly.192 The second argument falters because the assumption that vague
references to extrajudicial information are less prejudicial than specific
information is doubtful at best. First, as the Munoz court realized, vague
references to ―investigative information‖ may move the jury to believe that
the police has evidence of ―other crimes.‖193 Being told that it is hearing
evidence of what the police knew so it can understand why the investigation
proceeded as it did, the jury‘s most natural reaction to being denied the
specifics may be to believe that they concern wrongdoing not directly related
to the current case. And even courts that prefer vague references concede that
investigative background evidence suggesting other crimes is particularly
problematic.194
Moreover, a concern that jurors will infer misconduct from unexplained
official actions is hardly dispelled by testimony from officials that they acted
on unspecified information. Jurors satisfied that easily can undoubtedly be
trusted to follow the instructions to focus on the proof of the crimes‘
commission, not the legality of the investigators‘ conduct, eliminating the
need for the proof at all. In fact, drawing jurors‘ attention to the propriety of
the investigators‘ conduct by allowing the prosecution to establish that it had
unspecified information can create the need for more specific proof to dispel
doubts about whether the information withheld was sufficient to justify the
subsequent action. In one case, for example, the court first suggested
allowing police officers to testify that when they arrested the defendant, they
were acting ―on a tip‖ and then, apparently on second thought, suggested
allowing them to say ―that they received information consistent with [the

190. Maher, 454 F.3d at 21.
191. Id. at 23; Sanabria, 974 A.2d at 114–15; Cromer, 389 F.3d at 677.
192. United States v. Figueroa, 750 F.2d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Check, 582
F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1978); see also Cromer, 389 F.3d at 677 (testimony that ―explicitly, albeit not
directly, informed the jury that someone had implicated [the defendant] in illegal activities‖
implicates the Confrontation Clause; the officer testified that the defendant was a subject of the
investigation); cf. Johnson, 2007 WL 1417312, at *4 (although the officer testified to information
received from another officer, ―it was clear‖ that the second officer relayed the declarant‘s
description of the defendant).
193. State v. Munoz, 949 A.2d 155, 160 (N.H. 2008).
194. Sanabria, 974 A.2d at 112.
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defendant].‖195 But if the reason why the police officers acted as they did is
really an issue, how can one stop short of allowing them to tell the whole
truth—that an officer received a description of the defendant and his car from
a prostitute who said he was her pimp? And if it is not enough of an issue for
the officer to fully report his reason for stopping the defendant in his car, why
is it admissible at all? Meanwhile, holding the specific information
admissible is, of course, no improvement on the vague reference to
unspecified wrongdoing. The same courts that hold references to other crimes
are particularly prejudicial find similarly damaging statements ―relat[ing] to
an element of the charged offense.‖196
Thus, even those courts that have endorsed the ―information received‖
alternative have required it only when more specific information is ―not
necessary‖ to explain the investigator‘s conduct, by which they often seem to
mean that the specific information has no logical connection at all to
investigators‘ subsequent conduct. For example, in one case, the court
allowed proof that the officers had information about drug use on the premises
they searched, but not evidence that they were looking for the defendant,
because it did not affect their subsequent conduct by, for example, explaining
his arrest or the search of his room.197 In another, the court found error where
evidence purporting to explain an officer‘s actions was unknown to him when
he acted.198 What purports to be a balancing test for excluding insufficiently
probative or unduly prejudicial hearsay often turns out to be merely a way of
excluding the details of statements that are not even relevant to explain the
investigators‘ conduct.199 In many cases, the only consequence will be for
prosecutors to be more careful about selecting the officer whose actions could
have been affected by knowledge of the hearsay declarations—for example,
the arresting officer who can act upon all the information generated by the
investigation up to that point.
Meanwhile, the courts weighing evidence that has some logical relevance
as explanatory proof unwittingly demonstrate that the Confrontation Clause
problem cannot be balanced away. One court, for example, purported to find
the evidence inadmissible ―because it provided the primary evidence relevant‖

195. Johnson, 2007 WL 1417312, at *5.
196. Sanabria, 974 A.2d at 112.
197. Cromer, 389 F.3d at 677.
198. United States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Cabriera-Rivera, 583 F.3d 26, 34–35 (1st Cir. 2009). In that
case, the court found (1) that admission of context evidence violated the Confrontation Clause
because detailed testimony about the amounts that accomplices admitted to receiving in the robbery
―bore no relevance‖ to the defendant‘s investigation and (2) that one accomplice‘s confession
provided no investigative leads. Id.
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to an element of the charged crime.200 But the evidence violated the
Confrontation Clause if the jury used it for its truth, despite how critical; the
latter circumstance might affect whether its admission was harmless error or
whether the court should have dismissed the charge for insufficient proof.
Meanwhile, believing that more was required to explain the evidence‘s
exclusion, the court fell back onto claiming that the jury likely misused the
proof only because the prosecutor did so in his opening statement and closing
argument.201 But given the court‘s concession that the reason why the officers
arrested the defendant was relevant, the line between using the declarant‘s
statements to show why ―the deputies conclude[d the defendant] was the
pimp‖ and why the jury should so conclude was nonexistent.202 Other cases
purporting to analyze the evidence‘s prejudicial effect often reach a similar
conclusion: there is insufficient basis to reverse admission of the evidence
unless there is an additional error, such as omission of a limiting instruction or
improper use of the evidence by the prosecutor.203
At the end of the day, the balancing test devolves into an ad hoc test
focused more on the actions of the prosecutor and the trial judge than on the
conceded impact on the defendant‘s confrontation right of evidence whose
impermissible inference is the only one relevant to the jury‘s charge.204 It
gives the prosecution every reason to think that if they ―do it right,‖ they are
entitled to get before the jury evidence that helped persuade investigators of
the defendant‘s guilt, even though the jury is not allowed to rely on it for that
purpose. However well-intentioned the balancing approach may be, it serves
mostly to perpetuate the fiction that explanatory evidence is ―surely
relevant‖205 because it ―arguably provides some assistance to the jury in
understanding the background of the case.‖206 Indeed, this fiction can assure
200. Sanabria, 974 A.2d at 116; see also Cromer, 389 F.3d at 677 (evidence implicated the
defendant in a way that went to the heart of the prosecution‘s case); Cabriera-Rivera, 583 F.3d at 35
(evidence was ―the sole basis for the government‘s argument‖ that the defendant ―went to hide‖ with
the accomplice because ―[t]hey wanted to have an alibi‖).
201. State v. Johnson, No. 34539-1-II, 2007 WL 1417312, at *5 (Wash. App. Div. May 15,
2007).
202. The court said that ―the prosecutor in this case clearly relied on the descriptions as proof
that the person described was the pimp,‖ though it described her comments as addressing what led
the deputies to so conclude, not what should persuade the jury. Id.
203. Sanabria, 974 A.2d at 120 (evidence admitted without a limiting instruction); United
States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 23 (1st Cir. 2006) (spontaneous limiting instruction prevented
admission of evidence from being plain error); Silva, 380 F.3d at 1020–21 (improper argument and
no limiting instruction).
204. Maher, 454 F.3d at 23 (stating that the dividing line is between ―true background to
explain police conduct‖ and ―an attempt to evade Crawford,‖ and warning the prosecutor against
―backdoor attempts to get statements by non-testifying confidential informants before the jury‖).
205. Id.
206. United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 677 (6th Cir. 2004).
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that the balancing approach, even as applied by a sympathetic court, can
perpetuate the error that it purports to alleviate.
In United States v. Hinson,207 for example, the court set out to prevent
admission of out-of-court statements inadmissible for their truth as
background or context evidence, unless they were ―necessary to explain the
government‘s subsequent actions.‖208 It held that allowing a detective to
testify that she investigated Hinson because she heard that he supplied another
target with drugs was error. But the court‘s reasoning unwittingly guaranteed
that the practice of admitting such evidence will continue unabated.
The court began by making a fatal mistake that should be familiar by now.
It conceived that the necessity of the explanatory proof is measured by its
allowing ―the government . . . to tell a coherent story about its investigation,‖
not a coherent story about the defendant‟s commission of the crime.209 Having
decided to measure materiality by the evidence‘s connection to the
investigation‘s progress rather than to the elements of the crime, the court was
forced to conclude that out-of-court statements implicating the defendant will
typically be admissible non-hearsay evidence to explain why he was
investigated. It just so happened that the government in Hinson had already
introduced another out-of-court statement accusing Hinson that made it
―perfectly clear‖ why the police focused their investigation on him. Thus, that
the detective also heard from another source that Hinson was a drug supplier
was ―completely unnecessary to explain the police‘s subsequent actions.‖210
As if by alchemy, the protective balancing test becomes a per se rule
guaranteeing admission of ―ample admissible evidence‖ of at least one out-ofcourt accusation to show why the police investigated the defendant, even if he
never claims that he was improperly targeted. Before embarking on this
analysis, the Hinson court observed, ―Ascertaining the purpose evidence
serves, while essential to a determination of whether it constitutes
inadmissible hearsay or admissible background information, is not an easy
task.‖211 The difficulty in this case, however, is simply the result of a selfinflicted wound created when the court, like so many others, confused the
importance of the story of the investigation with the story of the defendant‘s
criminality as told through admissible evidence.
Absent the defendant‘s claim that the police acted improperly, and
considering that we do not ask jurors to decide whether they did, why is it
relevant, much less necessary, to show why the police suspected the defendant

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

585 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1336.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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at a cost to the Sixth Amendment, a cost that courts generally acknowledge?
If we look to the few courts that have addressed the question, we find this
explanation:
The non-hearsay evidentiary function of testimony about
a police radio call is to provide a ―background‖ explanation
for the testifying officer‘s actions—that is, to explain what
the officer was doing at the scene. The jury need not . . . be
led to believe that officers responding to a report of criminal
activity just ―happened by.‖ Neither, however, may the other
officers relate the contents of that report if the same
contextual explanation could be adequately conveyed by the
statement that the officer was responding to ―information
received.‖212
But why is it any more misleading to ask the officer in the first instance to
omit mentioning the radio call than to ask any witness to omit inadmissible
evidence whose exclusion invariably interrupts the flow of events as they
unfolded? In any event, what would be the harm if the jury did imagine that
the police just ―happened by?‖ Surely that would not adversely affect the
jury‘s deliberation in any way, much less justify violating the defendant‘s
confrontation rights. The only possible harm would be if the jury were to
conclude that the prosecution engaged in misconduct sufficient to justify an
acquittal despite finding proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime.
The likelihood of such an eventuality occurring sub rosa—that is,
contrary to instruction and without the defendant arguing government
misconduct and thus justifying admission of the explanatory evidence—is
exceedingly remote. Consequently, allowing the jury to think that officers
just happened upon the scene does nothing to mislead the jury with respect to
issues before it. Apart from whether that remote possibility justifies risking
evidentiary error, it surely does not justify unnecessarily admitting testimonial
hearsay whose use violates the Confrontation Clause. Such hearsay should
not be admitted at all until the defendant challenges the propriety of the
investigation. Only then should it be admitted for a limited purpose, requiring
courts to give a limiting instruction and also to consider whether other
expedients, such as redaction, better satisfy the need to rebut the defendant‘s
claims without unduly infringing the defendant‘s confrontation right.

212. United States v. Price, 458 F.3d 202, 208 (3d Cir. 2006). Of course, if defense counsel
seeks to exploit the omission of the radio call by saying something on cross-examination such as, ―So
you just happened by the scene and arrested my client for no reason,‖ he would open the door to
evidence explaining how the officer came to be there.
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Thus, admission of testimonial hearsay to justify investigators‘ actions
should be a violation of the Confrontation Clause, unless the defendant first
interjects the issue. Without such a clear constitutional rule, there will be no
hope of preventing the supposed non-hearsay use of testimonial hearsay from
undermining Crawford. That is not to say that every violation will amount to
reversible error; some errors will undoubtedly be harmless. But without the
rule, even well-meaning expedients only serve to perpetuate a practice that
assures that the Sixth Amendment will be honored in the breach.
VI. CONCLUSION
Crawford‘s historical analysis of the Confrontation Clause requires that
testimonial hearsay inadmissible at the Founding be inadmissible today
without confrontation. Hearsay, as defined by the common law during the
Founding era, did not exclude nonassertive conduct as Federal Rule 801
excludes it today. Consequently, although defined as non-hearsay by the
Federal Rules, testimonial, nonassertive conduct is inadmissible without
confrontation. To satisfy this requirement with minimal disruption, evidence
rules should redefine hearsay according to the declarant-centered definition
that includes all out-of-court statements whose probative value implicates the
declarant‘s credibility. Changing the statutory rule will familiarize courts and
counsel with the definition of hearsay that the Constitution requires them to
apply when prosecutors offer out-of-court, testimonial statements against
criminal defendants. Different jurisdictions can then choose whether to adopt
a hearsay exception for nonassertive conduct, which will apply to all hearsay
besides testimonial hearsay offered against criminal defendants.
To make the expanded confrontation right meaningful for testimonial,
nonassertive conduct and other testimonial hearsay, courts also need to
establish a constitutional rule holding that prosecutors cannot offer testimonial
hearsay for the non-hearsay purpose of explaining or justifying the actions of
investigators, unless the defendant questions the propriety of the investigation.
Courts currently allow prosecutors to exploit that rubric by routinely
admitting testimonial hearsay to explain actions that the defendant has not
questioned. By admitting the proof, courts have sanctioned an easy end run
around the Confrontation Clause that a ―not for the truth of the matter
asserted‖ limiting instruction does not block. Courts that admit testimonial
hearsay, supposedly to justify investigatory steps about whose propriety there
is no contest, invite juries to misuse the evidence to buttress the prosecution‘s
case. Having been told that there is a permissible use for the proof, juries are
certain to accept the judge‘s unwitting invitation to violate the Confrontation
Clause by confusing the significance of evidence available to investigators
and admissible at trial on the issue of the defendant‘s guilt.
The common law‘s definition of hearsay includes nonassertive conduct
and prohibits the use of testimonial hearsay to show its effect on investigators,
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unless it is needed to rebut an express or implied charge of investigative
impropriety. Without a firm appreciation for the common law‘s definition of
hearsay, which includes nonassertive conduct, and for the true use of
testimonial hearsay for its effect on investigators, which prohibits its use
entirely unless to rebut a charge of investigative impropriety, Crawford‘s
mandate will remain unfulfilled.

